Locating the Dergah in civil society: the Alevi youth's counter public and civility by Şahin, Gonca & Sahin, Gonca
LOCATING THE DERGAH IN CIVIL SOCIETY: THE ALEVI YOUTH'S 
COUNTER PUBLIC AND CIVILITY
by
Gonca Şahin 
Submitted to the Graduate School of Arts and Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
        Sabancı University 
 September, 2012
 
LOCATING THE DERGAH IN CIVIL SOCIETY: THE ALEVI YOUTH'S 
COUNTER PUBLIC AND CIVILITY
APPROVED BY:
       Ayhan Akman            ............................................................................
       (Thesis supervisor)
       Ayşe Kadıoğlu           .............................................................................    
        Leyla Neyzi              .................................................................................        
            DATE OF APPROVAL:  07. 08. 2012
     
© Gonca Şahin 2012
All Rights Reserved
LOCATING THE DERGAH IN CIVIL SOCIETY: THE ALEVI YOUTH'S 
COUNTER PUBLIC AND CIVILITY
Gonca Şahin
Political Science, MA Thesis, 2012
Thesis Advisor: Ayhan Akman
Keywords: civil society, youth activism, Alevi identity, counter public, civility
ABSTRACT
The fundamental objective of this thesis is to question the legitimacy of the prevalent 
assumptions of civil society with regard to who should constitute civil society and how 
the the experiences of the underprivileged are to be addressed through a scrutiny of 
micro social processes of power at the community level in a particular space. It is thus 
through an in-depth-analysis of informal youth activism within a politics of place- its 
dynamics, complexities, interactions, contestations,  and  normative orientations- that I 
have endeavored to show a possibility of context-specific patterns of civil society. The 
thesis is particularly concerned with unveiling some of the dynamics shaping the forms 
of public communication within the emergent autonomous space of the Alevi youth in 
the  Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı via the modalities of counter public. It is the argument of 
this thesis that the Şahkulu youth has successfully constructed a counter public within 
the  Dergah to  formulate  their  oppositional  interpretations of Alevi  identity and their 
grievances with regard to the unjust participatory privileges enjoyed by the people in 
power position while simultaneously constructing itself as an embryonic counter public 
vis-a-vis the general Alevi counter public. It has also built such a capacity of civility that 
epitomizes how-to-coexist with differences in a culturally diverse society as such. 
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DERGAHI SİVİL TOPLUM BAĞLAMINDA DÜŞÜNMEK: ALEVİ 
GENÇLERİN KARŞI KAMUSAL ALANI VE SİVİLLİĞİ
Gonca Şahin
Siyaset Bilimi Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2012
Tez Danışmanı: Ayhan Akman
Anahtar Kelimeler: sivil toplum, gençlik aktivizmi, Alevi kimliği, karşı kamusal alan, 
sivillik
ÖZET
Bu çalışmanın  temel  amacı,  sivil  toplumu  hangi  grupların  oluşturması  gerektiği  ve 
toplumdaki  dezavantajlı  grupların  deneyimlerinin  sivil  toplum bağlamında  nasıl  ele 
alınması gerektiğine ilişkin ortaya atılan hakim görüşlerin meşruiyetini sorgulamaktır. 
Bu  doğrultuda,  iktidarın  mikro  sosyal  süreçlerdeki  tezahürü  belirli  bir  topluluk  ve 
mekan ölçeğinde incelemeye tabi tutulacaktır. Bir mekan politikası bağlamında gelişen 
enformel  gençlik  aktivizminin-dinamikleri,  giriftlikleri,  etkileşimleri  ve  normatif 
yönelimleri- derinlemesine analizi aracılığıyla sivil toplumun farklı bağlamlarda tezahür 
edebilme  imkanı  bir  saha  çalışması  aracılığıyla  örneklendirilmeye  çalışılacaktır.  Bu 
çalışmayla özellikle amaçlanan  Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı'nda gelişmekte olan gençliğin 
özerk  alanını  şekillendiren  kamusal  iletişim şekillerinin  dinamiklerini  karşı  kamusal 
alan modalitesi aracılığıyla ortaya koymaktır. Bu tezin ortaya koyduğu temel argüman 
şudur:  Şahkulu  gençleri  Dergah  içerisinde  hem  kendi  muhalif  Alevilik  yorumlarını 
formüle  etmek  hem  de  iktidar  pozisyonundaki  insanların  dayandığı  adil  olmayan 
katılımsal ayrıcalıklara ilişkin memnuniyetsizliklerini ortaya koymak amacıyla  karşı bir 
kamusal  alan  inşa  etmişlerdir.  Aynı  zamanda  genel  Alevi  toplumu  içerisinde  de 
embriyonik bir karşı kamusal alan oluşturma eğilimindedirler. Ayrıca, Türkiye gibi çok 
kültürlü bir toplumda farklılıkların nasıl birarada varolabileceğini örnekleyen bir sivillik 
kapasitesi geliştirmişlerdir.  
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Introduction of the Research Question
This thesis endeavours to challenge the dominant conceptions of civil society which endow 
students of civil society with "a particular western model as a universal template to be replicated 
around the world" regardless of the idiosyncrasies of diverse societies (Hann, 1996, p.19). The 
essential components underlying this vision are; i) its philosophical underpinnings and historical 
development are rooted in the Western trajectory (Hall,  1995, pp.3-7), ii)  it  is located within a 
culture of individualism which is vested in individuals disassociated from the "social  cages" of 
primordial  bonds (Hall,  1995, p.15),  and iii)  associational  life  is  confined to  the sphere of  the 
visible, the formal, and the legal (Akman, 2012, p.322). 
Owing to the various processes of modernisation, Western models of civil society have been 
imported across societies. Outside of western contexts, most analysis of civil society suffers from "a 
discrepancy between the  theoretical  definitions  and the  workings  of  civil  society"  (Singerman, 
2006, p.2). White (1996, p.145) maintains that "The classical sense of civil society is little or no use 
in describing most of the non-western world below the level of government and the activities of a 
segment of educated westernised elites". In other words, certain organisations have been privileged 
so  far;  those  that  involve  democratic  values  and  institutions,  the  middle-classes,  elite,  male-
dominated associations, and formal structures of civil society (Kopecky, 2003; White, 1996). Thus, 
the components of civil society outside the western world should be tuned to the culturally specific  
patterns of civil society. 
This  study assumes  that  alternative  models  of  civil  society can  only be  constructed  by 
considering "the problems of  accountability,  trust  and cooperation that  all  groups face" (Hann, 
1996, p.19). This becomes possible only if students of civil society "focus on the function of civil  
society rather than specific structures" across different societies (Hudson cited in Schwedler, 1995, 
p.16). Considering this fact, this thesis rests on a re-conceptualisation of civil society on the basis of 
two constituents: the forms of public communication and the tolerance of differences. 
Through an in-depth research,  this  thesis  scrutinises  micro social  processes  of  power at 
community level within a politics of place, in order to question the legitimacy of the prevalent 
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assumptions  of  civil  society  with  regard  to  who  should  constitute  civil  society  and  how  the 
experiences of the underprivileged are to be addressed. 
The thesis is particularly concerned with unveiling the dynamics shaping the forms of public 
communication within the emergent autonomous space of the Alevi youth in the  Şahkulu Sultan 
Dergahı via the modalities of counter public, and combining them with an inquiry of their mode of 
interaction with the state, strangers, and in-group circles on the level of civility. 
In this thesis, I argue that the Şahkulu youth has successfully constructed a counter public 
within the Dergah in order to formulate their oppositional interpretations of Alevi identity and their 
grievances, with regard to the unjust participatory privileges enjoyed by people in a position of 
power,  while  simultaneously  constructing  itself  as  an  embryonic  counter  public  vis-à-vis  the 
general Alevi counter public. It has also built a capacity of civility that epitomises how to coexist 
with differences in a culturally diverse society. 
1.2. Significance of the Study
The findings of this study contribute to the literature on civil society in a variety of ways. 
First of all,  this study demonstrates that a culturally specific pattern of social relationships, the 
Dergah, might carry out the same functions as those of liberal models of civil society in other parts 
of the world; namely, organised forms of communication and the encouragement of tolerance of 
differences.  Secondly,  it  shows  that  there  is  a  need  to  shift  the  focus  of  studies  from formal 
structures to informal structures, since, informally organised groups involve a great deal of civic 
activism as well.  An informality-sensitive perspective will  also help to unveil  the associational 
capacity  of  the  marginalised  groups  which  are  often  precluded  from engagement  in  formally 
institutionalised forms of participation due to their disadvantageous status arising from age, sex, 
class,  and  ethnicity.  With  regard  to  this,  the  category  of  age  constitutes  an  important  axis  of 
exclusion in this study. Considering the underrepresentation of the youth in the study of various 
social movements in the Turkish context, the study also acknowledges that:
There is  a need for in-depth ethnographic studies of young people of the post-1980 
generation.  There  are  still  few  studies  of  the  Islamist,  Kurdish  nationalist,  Alevi, 
Kurdish,  neo-Kemalist,  and  Turkish  nationalist  movements  from  an  age-based 
perspective,  given  that  young  people  are  disproportionately  represented  in  these 
movements (Neyzi, 2001, p. 427).  
Thirdly, the findings reveal that civil society associations do not necessarily function only to 
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countervail the state authority. Rather, they might have a function within the micro social processes 
of power at a community level in a particular space within a web of relationships among different 
social  actors.  Fourthly,  activism  among  Alevi  youth  suggests  that  an  ethos  shaped  around  a 
communitarian culture might also prompt a good deal of civic engagement, without stifling the 
members as much as that which transpires within an ethos of an individualist culture. Finally, the 
relationship between the Alevi faith, despite not being considered a part of Islam by some, and civil  
society might bring a new dimension to the debates on the compatibility of Islam and civil society 
which has, to date,  in the main, been discussed in the context of the Sunni Islam. 
1.3. Methodological Issues and the Scope of the Thesis
This thesis should be interpreted as a space-opening study for a subject area which has not 
hitherto drawn the curiosity of scholars. It does not claim to reach conclusions which reflect all 
Alevis in general or all Alevi youth in particular. Rather, the focus of the study is limited to the 
space of the  Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı.  Yet, this study has some implications which go beyond the 
boundaries of the Dergah. For instance, the paper argues that Şahkulu Youth might have constructed 
an  embryonic  counter  public  vis-à-vis  the  wider  Alevi  counter  public.  To  reach  a  definitive 
conclusion in this respect requires further investigation with regard to other youths in other spaces 
and their relationship with Alevis in power positions within these spaces. Such an investigation may 
demonstrate whether this form of youth activism is peculiar to the Şahkulu youth or whether there 
are other youths’ spaces in a similar position. Thus, future researchers might examine whether it is  
possible to discern the emergence of an autonomous Alevi youth identity in the wider Alevi public. 
This thesis endeavours to investigate any possibility of culturally specific patterns of civil 
society.  It  requires "shifting our focus to the informal structures,  networks, beliefs,  values,  and 
everyday  interpersonal  practices"  (Hann,  1996,  p.13).  Considering  the  nature  of  informal 
associations as "unlicensed, unregulated, and unenumerated by the state" (Singerman, 2006, p.2), 
social  sciences’ research methods,  which are intended to measure civil  society on the basis  of  
organisational  capacity,  (possibly  through  quantitative  methods  or  loosely  involved  qualitative 
methods) seem less able to help an exploration of the deeper dynamics of civil society. This task 
might only become possible through the anthropology of civil society. Thus, ethnography seems to 
become an ideal research instrument for fulfilling the objective of the study.  
Before selecting the  Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı as a field of study, the author visited several 
cemhouses in Istanbul (Kartal Cemevi, Karacaahmet Cemevi, Yeni Bosna Cemevi, and Ok Meydanı 
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Cemevi). The  Şahkulu was selected on the basis that it differed from others in a variety of way. 
While others are modern constructions almost exclusively utilised in the performance of the  cem 
ritual, the Şahkulu is a historical shrine and the cemhouse occupies only a small part of its overall 
functions. Considering this, the author rationalised that the Şahkulu might approximate more to an 
example of culturally specific pattern of civil  society.  Moreover,  being one of the oldest  Alevi 
centres of faith in Istanbul, the author assumed that it was disposed to reflect established patterns of 
social relationships and networks. 
The total  duration of  participation-observation in  the  Şahkulu amounts  approximately to 
seven months from November,  2011 to May,  2012. During this  time the author was present in 
almost all the physical and cultural spaces within the Dergah: the lokma house, cemhouse, Alevilik 
lessons, thursday conversations, semah lessons, remembrance days of important figures, the Women 
Commission's weekly meetings, and the Youth Commission's weekly meetings. Entering the field 
was easier than expected; when it was known that the author was preparing a master's thesis, most 
people helped as a matter of course. It should be noted that, due to the similarity in ages of the  
author  and  the  participants,  contact  with  the  members  of  the  Youth  Commission  was 
straightforward; however, access to people in a position of power was more difficult, and might 
have led to the underrepresentation of their stances in the analysis. 
Fieldwork  observations  are  combined  with  the  in-depth  and  semi-structured  interviews 
which created a space for the respondents’ narrative. Snow-ball sampling of young respondents was 
chosen  for the interview process.  Four of the interviewees were active participants of the Youth 
Commission. Particular attention was paid to ensure the involvement of the less experienced juniors 
along with the more experienced seniors. The sample also included  one interviewee who was a 
former youth member who broke off relations with the Commission owing to disagreements. The 
rationale  being  that  it  might  be  helpful  to  hear  the  voice of  an  internal  dissident  in  order  to 
understand the internal power relations within the Commission. The other four people are, in turn, 
the Dede, the manager, the head of the Women's Commission, and the newly-youth-sponsored head 
of the Dergah. Although it would have been instructive to interview the former head of the Dergah, 
who received much criticism from the members of the Youth Commission, the author was unable to 
contact him despite e-mails and phone calls. 
The subject matter of this study is not  Alevilik. Rather, the  Şahkulu youth constitutes the 
subject matter of the study. For this reason, the author never endeavoured to define and draw a 
boundary of the Alevilik. Furthermore, the paper does not rely on one sole interpretation of identity. 
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However, there are some points which require examining the respondents' perception of identity. 
For  instance,  the  youth’s  discursive  space  diverges  from the  comprehensive  Alevi  public  with 
regard to their oppositional interpretation of identity. At this point, the respondents were asked how 
they define  the  Alevilik.  Considering  Geertz's  definition  of  religion  as  "a  cultural  system",  the 
questions were not prepared in order to uncover theological conceptions of faith, but rather, were 
designed to discern the youths’ interpretation of faith on their daily life practices. Furthermore, a 
similar attitude was embraced in framing the status of the space, the Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı.  The 
author did not ascribe a definition to the Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı, either as a cemhouse or a culture 
house; instead, the respondents were asked how they view the Dergah. 
1.4. Organisation of the Thesis 
There are several critical tasks that this study (through seven chapters) will undertake in 
order to elucidate the construction of the Alevi youth’s counter public and its mode of interaction 
with  differences  in  society.  Having  introduced  the  research  question,  its  significance,  and 
methodology in this  chapter,  the second chapter  attempts  to  gain fundamental  insights  into the 
historical and philosophical development of the concept of civil society, its usage in contemporary 
debates, and its shortcomings, particularly through its importation to the non-western world. The 
third  chapter  provides  further  background  information  on  contemporary  debates  in  Alevi 
community and defines the context of the research's micro-space. Chapter four aims at constructing 
an alternative criteria to explore civil society structures across the world to which are not predicated 
on a Euro-centric concept. The fifth chapter endeavours to unveil some of the dynamics shaping the 
forms of public communication within the emergent autonomous space of the Alevi youth in the 
Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı via the modalities of the counter public. Chapter six combines this analysis 
with an inquiry into the youth's mode of interaction with the state, its members and strangers on the  
level  of  civility.  Finally,  the  paper  concludes  with analysis  of  the implications  of  the  informal 
activism of the Alevi youth for civil society debates in Turkey and raises some questions for future 
research. 
5
CHAPTER 2
      LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. The Origins of  Civil Society in  Western Political Thought
The conceptual history of civil society can be traced back to Greek political philosophy like 
many other concepts of political thought. Yet, in its contemporary meaning, the concept of civil  
society has begun to develop in early modern period (Kaldor, 2002, p.3). 
Historical developments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries- the commercialization of 
land, labor, and capital, the growth of market economies, the age of discoveries, and the English and 
later North American and continental revolutions- put pressure on the legitimacy of the existing 
beliefs on the social order (Seligman, 2002, p.14). "Within this major and radical reorientation of 
European social thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries", "the image of civil society as 
an ethical model" began to appear as an alternative source of social order (Seligman, 2002, p.15). 
Seligman perceives it as:
a critical new attempt to argue the moral sources of the social order from within the 
human  world  and  without  recourse  to  an  external  or  transcendent  referent.  This 
challenge and, with it,  that of squaring the newly emerging interests of increasingly 
autonomous individuals with some vision of the public good provided the theoretical 
and ethical ground for the idea of civil society (p.15). 
Kaldor comments that the idea of civil society has always been related to "the formation of a 
particular type of political authority" (2003, p.1). In this respect, civil society in the early modern 
period was put into use in the intellectual idiom to characterize the new forms of political authority 
in the transition from absolutist monarchies to the modern state (Kaldor, 2003, p.1). 
 
The views of John Locke among the eighteenth century political thinkers are of particular 
importance in reflecting this association between civil society and political authority. In Locke's 
conception like the other political thinkers of the early modern era, the idea of individual rights and 
social contract lie at the center of the notion of civil society (Seligman, 2002). In this view, civil  
society corresponds to "a type of state characterized by a social contract" or "a society governed by 
laws, based on the principle of equality before the law, in which everyone was subject to the law; in  
other words, a social contract agreed  among the individual members of society" (Kaldor, 2003, 
p.584). That's to say, civil society is not viewed as a distinct entity from the political society or state 
6
(Khilhani, 2001, p.18). Rather, it is distinguished from the "non-civil societies" like state of nature 
or absolutist monarchies (Kaldor, 2003, p.7). 
This brings us to another layer of civil society which came into prominence in Locke's stance. 
This  is  the  image of  civil  society as "a zone of  civility"  (Kaldor,  2003,  p.7).  Accordingly,  the 
members of civil society are supposed to "act in a civilized way towards each other, treating each 
other with mutual respect, tolerance, and confidence" (Kaldor, 2003, p.3). In other words, violence 
ceases to be seen as a legitimate way of settling disputes among individuals. 
Although Locke was the first who saw the idea of private property as an important component 
of civil society, it was the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, particularly Adam Smith and 
Adam Ferguson, who associated the development of market economy with civil society (Ehrenberg, 
1999, p.96). That's to say, the thinkers of the "commercial society" believed that markets create 
individuals and individuals become bearers of civil society (Kaldor, 2003, p.7; Seligman, 1992, 
p.26). 
In this tradition, civil society is viewed as "the public arena of exchange and interaction" 
(Seligman, 2002, p.18). However, the workings of this realm are not governed by merely dictates of 
utility and rational self-interest. Rather, this is "a realm of solidarity held together by the force of 
moral sentiments and natural affections" (Seligman, 2002, p.19). This image of civil society as an 
ethical vision embraces a particular understanding of reason which does not deny the idea of self-
interest  and but also does not neglect the idea of "putting the public or social  good above our 
individual interests" (Seligman, 2002, p.20).  Seligman considers the contributions of the Scottish 
thinkers  as  "an  attempt  to  find  or,  rather,  posit  a  synthesis  between  a  number  of  developing 
oppositions...between the individual and the social, the private and the public, egotism and altruism, 
as well as between a life governed by reason and one governed by the passions" (Seligman, 2002, 
p.16). 
The  views  of  the  Scottish  political  economists  had  a  strong  impact  in  shaping  Hegel's 
conception of civil society (Kaldor, 2003, p.7). Cohen and Arato assert that the concept of civil 
society turned into "a theory of a highly differentiated and complex order" at the hands of Hegel 
(1994, p.91). With Hegel, the concept acquires an autonomous sphere as distinct from the political  
society. Hegel defines civil society as "the realm of difference, intermediate between the family and 
the state" (Kaldor,  2002, p.4). In other words, Hegel's  model of civil  society involves markets. 
That's why he called it as "the bourgeois society’ (Bürgerliche Gesellschaft)" (Kaldor, 2002, p.4). 
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However, the market economy is only one among a plethora of actors performing in civil society. 
Thus, Hegel perceives of civil society as: 
the achievement of the modern world…the territory of mediation where there is  free 
play for every idiosyncrasy, every talent, every accident of birth and fortune, and where 
waves of passion gush forth, regulated only by reason, glinting through them (as cited in 
Kaldor, 2002, p.4)
With Hegel the concept of civil  society goes through a transformation in several  respects 
(Seligman, 2002, p. 50). At first, Hegel views civil society as "an object of historical development" 
rather than a "metahistorical reality in which one can seek a normative order beyond the exigencies 
of history" (Seligman, 2002, p.50). Secondly, Hegel considers civil society as a realm of mutually 
conflicting interests. To Hegel,  the main tension in civil society is that different groups in civil 
society cannot overcome their particularized interests. The resultant conflict is unavoidable and has 
a  potential  to  disrupt  the  bonds  of  civil  society  ultimately  (Seligman,  2002,  p.50).  Finally,  as 
opposed  to  the  thinkers  of  the  Scottish  Enlightenment  who locate  the  ideal  of  reconciling  the 
particular and the universal in civil society, it ceases to be seen as the sphere of ethical realization in 
Hegel's thought. Instead, state is the proper realm of ethical realization (Seligman, 2002, p.50). 
Grounded on the Hegelian conception of civil society, Karl Marx interpreted the concept in 
the context  of  the  class  relations  of  capitalist  mode of  production (Schwedler,  1995,  p.4).  The 
following passage is important in exemplifying the economism of Marxist vision (Kaldor, 2003, 
p.584). Marx viewed civil society as: 
the theater of history...civil society embraces all  the material relations of individuals 
within a definite stage of the development of productive forces. It embraces the whole 
commercial and industrial life of a given stage (as cited in Kaldor, 2003)
Marx viewed the bourgeois notion of civil society as a tool for "the consolidation of capitalist class 
interests  behind ideological  claims  of  reason and universality"  (Woods,  1992,  p.81).  Following 
Hegel's thoughts, Marx did not believe that civil society is a sphere where the ethical realization of  
conflicting particular interests can be reconciled. Yet, as different from Hegel, state can not become 
the realm of ethical realization because state is itself representative of bourgeois interests in Marx's 
thought (Seligman, 2002, p.26). Therefore, with Hegel and Marx, the classic idea of civil society 
comes to an end (Seligman, 2002, p.27). 
When it comes to the twentieth century, Antonio Gramsci made a decisive break within the 
Marxist school of civil society. Civil society in Gramsci does not reside in the structural sphere as  
does in Marx's vision, but in the super-structural sphere (Bobbio, 1998, p.82). That's to say, civil 
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society  has an autonomous domain from both the state and the economy. Family is also considered  
as  a  part  of  civil  society  as  distinct  from  liberalism  (Chambers,  2002,  p.90).  Specifically,  In 
Gramsci, 
civil society...comprises families and all private institutions whether religious, cultural, 
or economic, but also political parties, labor unions, and all forms of organization and 
resistance of the exploited classes (as cited in Singerman, 2006, p.5)
In Gramsci's thought, the image of civil society as "a system of needs understood in primarily 
economic terms " is replaced by an image of civil society "as a system of ideas, values, ideologies,  
and interests understood primarily in sociological and political terms" (Chambers, 2002, p.91). The 
pivotal  concept  in  this  vision  of  civil  society is  the  term  hegemony.  Gramsci  offered  the  term 
hegemony as an answer to the question of "Why are the masses not revolutionary?" (Chambers, 
2002, p.90). That's to say, the bourgeois society formed strong norms and institutions to consolidate 
their hegemony, grounded on the consent of the working classes (Singerman, 2006, pp.5-6). Yet, this 
sphere of sociocultural struggle is open to all actors (Singerman, 2006, p.6). The exploited classes 
may  organize  themselves  to  overcome  the  bourgeois  domination  by  developing  their  counter-
hegemony. 
The configuration of civil society in Gramsci as "the realm of culture, ideology and political 
debate" (Kaldor, 2003, p.584) have influenced the students of critical theory in their conception of 
civil  society  as  a  "sphere  of  identity  formation,  social  integration,  and  cultural  reproduction" 
(Chambers, 2002, p.91). 
2.2. The Idea of Civil Society in Western Historical Development 
Many scholars have argued that the idea of civil society as "an existing social or historical 
reality" (Seligman, 1995, p.4) has its origins in Western historical development (Hall, 1995; Mardin, 
1995). Şerif Mardin, who calls civil society as "a Western dream", conceives it as a product  of 
certain transformations in the social history of Western Europe. In tracing the deepest moorings of 
the concept in this history, Mardin focuses on particularly the history of medieval Western town. In 
his view, it is of central importance because "each one of the thresholds of this history adds another 
characteristic layer to our present understanding of civil society as a concept" (Mardin,1995, p.280). 
In this regard, the study of medieval urban history reveals the fact that the idea of "autonomous,  
secular collectives with legal personality operating within a frame of rationalized self-referential 
law" began to develop in that epoch of the Western history (Mardin, 1995, p.278).
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Grounded on this background of the medieval town, civil society in Western Europe emerged 
as a result of a process of differentiation in the eighteenth-century (Woods, 1992, p.78). Habermas 
argues that the emergence of the bourgeoisie and the later efforts of this class had a direct impact in  
shaping the notion of civil society (as cited in Woods, 1992, p.79). The role of the bourgeoisie in 
this formation was to struggle against the domination of both the patrimonial state and the church.  
With regard to this, Poggi expresses: 
A modern  civil  society  began  to  appear  in  the  18th  century  with  the  decline  of 
absolutism and the development of new normative assumptions about the separation of 
public/private spheres between state and society (as cited in Woods, 1992, p. 84).
Habermas asserts  that civil  society appeared as "the genuine domain of private autonomy 
[that] stood opposed to the state" in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (as cited in Calhoun, 
1996, p.7).  Intellectual,  scientific,  and literary salons and coffeehouses  played a  crucial  role  as 
institutional bases of the emergent civil society (Calhoun, 1996, pp.10-12; Woods, 1992, pp. 78-79). 
These literary circles functioned as "explicitly political arenas in which attitudes about the arbitrary 
nature of monarchical authority were developed and criticized" (Woods, 1992, p.79).  
At the heart of all the theoretical attempts presented insofar to formulate a notion of civil 
society lies "the problematic relation between the private and the public, the individual and the 
social, public ethics and individual interests, individual passions and public concerns" (Seligman, 
1995, p.5). According to Seligman, "this dialectic between public and private" is an indispensable 
property of civil society (Seligman, 1995, p.5). Considering the interplay between these dualisms, 
the notion of  civil society  in the Western European tradition embraces a particular conception of 
the individual. This is an "autonomous, agentic, self-determining individuality" who is not devoted 
to the dictates of any external agent but only strives to fulfill  his/her own autonomy (Seligman, 
1995, p.5). To Seligman, the formation of  the individual as the primary agent of civil society is  
buried in  the background of the Western social  history.  Its  roots originated from the "religious 
doctrines of sectarian or ascetic puritanism...whose roots were firmly tied to Reformation religion" 
(Seligman, 1995, p.6). 
Gellner  (1995)  associates  the  emergence  of  the  individual  as  a  self-autonomous  actor  in 
society with the processes of  the modern state  formation and capitalism.  The concept  of  "the 
modularity of man" is central in understanding Gellner's vision of civil society. The modular man 
can  combine  into  effective  associations  and  institutions,  without  these  being  total, 
many-stranded, underwritten by ritual, and made stable through being linked to a whole 
set of relationships, all of these then being tied with each other and so immobilized 
(Gellner, 1995, p.41).
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Modularity is a prerequisite for civil society (Gellner, 1995, p.42). The modular man cannot only 
face the despotism of political  authority but  also "escape social  cages",  imposed by primordial 
bonds (Hall, 1995, p.15). Thus, not every set of autonomous groups are conducive to the formation 
of civil society. Individualism is an essential component of civil society in Gellner's view (Hall,  
1995, p. 15). 
Yet, the possible dangers of individualism  have become a serious concern for some scholars 
of civil society. One of such concerns has been that individualism in modern societies might arouse 
the feelings of privatism, apathy, atomism, and passivity which are ultimately likely to  produce 
authoritarianism (Kaldor, 2003, p.15). Among the scholars sharing this concern, Tocqueville argues,
Around the issue of individualism will be seen to cluster certain propensities, which 
together give rise to what we may call the problem of democracy. These are the passion 
for well being and material comforts, a concern for one's private welfare to the exclusion 
of all consideration of public affairs, and an inevitable drift towards mediocrity. They 
make democratic man all too prone to accept or drift into a despotism securing him 
these pursuits or preferences (as cited in Kaldor, 2003, pp.15-16).
Tocqueville's suggestion to the problem of despotism based on atomism is to encourage the "re-
emergence  of  public  virtue".  One  effective  way  of  doing  this  in  Tocqueville  is  to  incite  the 
participation of individuals in the public sphere through associations or self-organizations (Woods, 
1992, p.84). 
2.3. 'Revival' of Civil Society: Contemporary Debates
In the last a few decades of the twentieth century, we have witnessed a revival of interest in 
the theme of civil society. Yet, the term has been employed to characterize very different sorts of  
groups in various societies. Mary Kaldor classifies the contemporary usages of the concept under 
three categories. These are the "activist version", "neo-liberal version", and "post-modern version" 
(Kaldor, 2003). 
The "activist  version" of civil  society is  used to characterize the new social  movements 
which  emerged  after  1968  and  the  opposition  movements  of  the  1970s  and  1980s  which 
simultaneously  erupted  against  the  military  dictatorships  in  Latin  America  and  against  the 
totalitarian  Communist  regimes  in  Eastern  Europe.  The  distinctive  character  of  these  social 
movements is to open up a space outside the domains of conventional politics in which people can 
deliberate and act in order to democratize the system (Kaldor, 2003, p.588). 
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The "neo-liberal  version" of civil  society involves  non-governmental  organizations,  non-
profit organizations, charities and voluntary organizations, comprising of the 'third sector', which 
have  begun to  emerge  in  the  United  States  in  the  1970s  and 1980s.  Kaldor  asserts  that  these 
organizations are "neither controlled by the state nor the market, but which play an essential role in 
facilitating the operation of both" (Kaldor, 2003, p.589). Specifically,  they function as "a social  
safety net" against the failures of markets and governments (Kaldor, 2003, p.589). 
Finally, the "post-modern version" of civil society is associated with the culturally specific 
patterns of engagement. The proponents of this vision, particularly social anthropologists, argue that 
instead  of  imposing  western  models  of  civil  society on  the  societies  which  had  gone  through 
different social and historical trajectories, our formulations of civil society should pay attention to 
the alternative experiences of other societies across the world (Kaldor, 2003, p.590). 
2.4. In Quest of Civil Society Beyond the 'West': Contemporary Debates in the Middle East
The Western political thought determines the ingredients in the much of meaning of the 
concept  of  civil  society.  The  interplays  among  the  various  processes  of  Western  historical 
development  have  given  the  form that  civil  society  has  taken  currently.  Yet,  the  concept  has 
continued to spread across the societies which have completely distinct societal structures. It is not a 
secret that most of the societies in the world have been exposed to the modernization in a varying 
degree. However, societies continue to possess their traditional structures and value systems more 
or less. This leaves us with the question of to what extent it is appropriate to employ this concept in 
studying the societies whose socio-cultural structures and historical heritages show differences from 
the Western societies and to what extent it is legitimate to examine civil society in these societies  in  
the same way we study in the 'West'. 
Considering this puzzle, the Muslim societies of the Middle East have come out as the much 
debated  case  because  Islam  and  Islamic  societies  have  often  been  seen  as  the  other  side  of 
modernity. In answering this puzzle,  it is possible to identify three types of tendencies among the 
scholars  studying civil society in the Middle East (Schwedler, 1995, pp.7-24).  The first group of 
scholars are skeptical of any possibility of a civil society in the Middle East on the ground that  
Islam, traditionalism, and primordialism are of hindrance to the emergence of civil society in the 
region. The second group of scholars assert that the Middle East could be home to civil society;  
however, they are so much preoccupied with the Western models of civil society to the exclusion of 
indigenous experiences. Finally, the last group of scholars, who are a few in number, strive to shift 
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the axis of discussions from the euro-centric models towards context-specific experiences  through 
ethnographic accounts. 
The stances of the first group are imbued with the vestiges of Orientalism and modernization 
theory (Singerman, 2006, p.2). The  marriage of modernization theory with Orientalism reflects 
itself  on  the  thoughts  of  scholars  in  that  "  'West'  and  the  'Orient'  are  conceived  of  as  entities  
possessing internal homogeneity and external differences and, in many cases, properties opposite to 
those  of  the  other"  (Kamali,  2006,  p.27).  Hence,  Islamic  societies  constitute  the  other  side  of 
modernity as the 'traditional', the 'premodern', and the 'others'. In other words, Islam and Islamic 
societies  are  viewed as  the  antithesis  of  capitalism,  democracy (civil  society),  rationalism,  and 
reason (Kamali,  2006,  p.32).  In  keeping  with  this,  Kedourie's  thought  is  representative  of  this 
approach: 
there is  nothing in  the  political  traditions  of  the  Arab world-which are  the political 
traditions  of  Islam-which might  make familiar,  or  indeed intelligible,  the organizing 
ideas of constitutional and representative government. The notion of state..., the notion 
of popular sovereignty..., the idea of representation, of elections, of popular suffrage, of 
political institutions being regulated by laws laid down by a parliamentary assembly,... 
of society being composed of a multitude of self-activating,  autonomous groups and 
associations-all of these are profoundly alien to the Muslim political tradition( as cited 
in Schwedler, 1995, p.7).
Bernard Lewis also embraces a similar position: 
Islamic history shows no councils  or communes, no synods or parliaments,  nor any 
other kind of elected or representative assembly....There was no point, since the need for 
a procedure of corporate collective decision never arose (as cited in Schwedler, 1995, p. 
8). 
The Orientalist stances of Islamic societies are endeavored to construct  "an imagined Muslim 
world as a single, homogeneous reality" (Kamali, 2006, p.35) through selective interpretation of 
Islam over one particular theology with a frozen and timeless reading of Islam. The implication of 
this  approach is  to  ignore cultural  complexity of Islamic societies.  With regard to this,  Kamali 
points out (2006, p.35): 
During  the  one  and  half  millenia  of  its  existence,  Islam has  passed  through  many 
theological reinterpretations and social  reconstructions. The theological controversies 
over what it means to be a Muslim, how an Islamic society has to be shaped and how to  
run  such  a  society  began  shortly  after  the  death  of  the  Prophet  in  632  AD.  The 
expansion of Islam as  a  religion into far  reaching parts  of  Asia,  Africa and Europe 
forced  Muslim conquerors  and  missionaries  to  adjust  Islam to  the  cultures  of  new 
societies, which included their religious traditions, histories and institutions. The mutual 
adjustment of Islam and the new societies helped to create very diverse societies in 
which the contextualized religion was just one of many properties that separated every 
single 'Islamic' society from the others. 
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Therefore, the empirical accounts which reveal not only external differences among various Islamic 
societies but also internal differences within the Islamic societies such as urban/rural, elite/popular, 
diverse religious and ethnic groups, and different socioeconomic and cultural classes raise questions 
about the legitimacy of such Orientalist perspectives (Kamali, 2006, p.35).
The  ethnocentric  understanding  of  the  Middle  Eastern  societies  leaves  itself  to  a  more 
cautious understanding at the hands of the second group of scholars (Norton, 1996). This genre of 
scholarship points out that authoritarianism is not an inherent property of the culture and tradition of 
the  Middle  Eastern  societies  but  rather  the  political  processes  and  struggles  for  power  are 
responsible for the long standing tradition of authoritarianism in the region (Schwedler, 1995, p.9). 
Grounded  on  this  argument,  if  the  Muslim  societies  are  experiencing  relatively  low  levels  of 
associational life, the responsibility of the governments cannot be neglected here. 
A close  scrutiny  of  the  associational  life  in  the  region  demonstrates  that  people  have 
achieved creating autonomous spheres of deliberation and action despite the suppressive attempts of 
the autocratic  governments  (Norton,  1995, p.viii).  Norton expresses,  "the region is  replete with 
voluntary organizations, trade unions, human rights groups, women's associations, minority rights 
groups,  and  various  other  social  organizations"  (as  cited  in  Schwedler,  1995,  p.10).  Norton 
particularly  refers  to  the  women's  movements  in  Algeria,  Egypt,  Kuwait,  Yemen  and  the 
Palestinians;  the  businessmen's  groups  and  professional  associations  in  Jordan  and  Egypt;  the 
diwanayat  (meeting  groups)  in  Kuwait;  and  the  peace  movement,  labor  unions  and  election-
monitoring  organizations  of  Lebanon  (Norton,  1993,  p.  209).  Yet,  this  vision  involves  only 
particular types of associational groups. It confines the sphere of associational life to the sphere of  
the formal, the legal, and the visible. This exemplifies "the objectivist conception of civil society". 
    
The  proponents  of  the  objectivist  vision  conceive  of  civil  society  as  a  "concrete  and 
quantifiable"  entity  (Hann,  1996,  p.16).  In  other  words,  civil  society  comprises  of  various 
associations whose organizational capacity (strength, size, structure, etc) is open to observation and 
measurement (Akman, 2012, p.322). Particularly, scholars in this genre of civil society investigate:
how many CSOs operate in a country, how many members they have, how effectively 
these  members  are  mobilized,  what  issue  areas  these  CSOs  operate  in  and  what 
resources  they command (financial,  political,  cultural)...whether  the  membership  is 
active or passive, due paying or not, multiple or single-issue oriented, etc (Akman, 
2012, p.322). 
The implication of employing the objectivist western models in the study of associational 
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life in the Middle East is the creation of a "discrepancy between theoretical definitions and the 
workings of civil society" (Singerman, 2006, p.2). Prioritizing a particular model, which is based on 
a  value driven criteria,  will  become conducive to  produce biased empirical  findings (Kopecky, 
2003,  p.7).  In  particular,  certain organizations  have  been privileged so far:  those that  embrace 
democratic values and institutions (Kopecky, 2003, p.11), middle-class or elite and male-dominated 
associations, and formal structures of civil society (White, 1996). 
A number of scholars have commented on the various ways to diminish the gap between the 
empirical reality of the region and theoretical conceptions. In this context, Hudson argues:
Focusing on the function of civil society, rather than specific structures, one can ask, 
"What sort of groups in the Middle East-be they familial, professional, tribal, religious, 
clan-based,  or  whatever-fulfill  the  function  of  civil  society?"  How  do  citizens  and 
communities address their interests or grievances vis-a-vis government policies? When 
the question is framed this way, the idea of civil society may highlight a wide range of  
social interactions that might otherwise be dismissed as irrelevant. In this sense, civil 
society indeed exists throughout the Middle East. Where civil society is weak, it is often 
the  result  of  government  oppression  rather  than  deficiencies  within  the  societies 
themselves (as cited in Schwedler, 1995, p.16).  
By the same token, Hann reiterates that the attempts for "the replication of one particular western 
model around the world" is futile; rather, scholars should cease to view the Western experience as a 
universal template and turn "to the problems of accountability, trust and cooperation that all groups 
face" (1996, p.19). 
      
This consideration requires us to scrutinize the culturally specific patterns of civil society. To 
this purpose, there is a need  for shifting our focus to the informal structures, networks, beliefs,  
values, and everyday interpersonal practices (Hann, 1996, p.13). The concept of informality is of 
particular importance because  the formal institutionalization is not a strong part of life in this part  
of the world. Informality refers to the state of being "unlicensed, unregulated, and unenumerated by 
the state" (Singerman, 2006, p.2). In other words, informal associations operate outside "the direct 
supervision and regulation of the laws regulating formal associations" (Singerman, 2006, p.17). In 
this context, research methods of the social sciences which are intended to measure civil society on 
the basis of organizational capacity are less likely to explore the deeper dynamics of civil society in  
the  region.  This  task  becomes  only possible  through an  anthropology of  civil  society or  other  
perspectives which are sensitive to the study of everyday interpersonal interactions. In this regard, 
Hann (1996, p.2) comments on this task:
the most obvious agenda for anthropological contributions to the civil society debates 
would be precisely to particularize and to make concrete: to show how an idea with its 
origins  in  European  intellectual  discourse  has  very  different  referents,  varying 
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significantly even within European societies. This agenda would also be concerned with 
analogues to the discourse of civil society in non-European cultural traditions.
The following part  is  dedicated to an overview of some examples which may exemplify these 
culturally specific patterns. 
CIVICUS Civil Society Index project is a worldwide research project whose primary task is 
to assess the state of civil society in countries around the world (TUSEV, 2011). Considering its 
assessment criteria which involve a distinguished focus on the organizational capacity,  the CSI 
project exemplifies the "objectivist conception of civil society". The types of organizations which 
comply with the CSI criteria are those which are the formal, the legal, and the visible. 
According to  the  2011 CIVICUS Civil  Society Index Analytical  Report  for  Turkey,  the 
levels of citizen participation are insufficient. In particular, there is one civil society organization 
for every 780 people in the country (TUSEV, 2011, p.18). The same report informs that young 
people under twenty-five, women, members of low income groups, and ethnic minorities are under-
represented in civil society organizations (2011, p.19). How should we interpret these findings? Can 
we safely assume that the rest of the people do not participate? How should we understand the 
situation of  those underprivileged people on the basis  of  class,  sex,  age,  and various  forms of 
subordinate  identities,  who  could  not  get  a  chance  to  raise  their  voice  through  formally 
institutionalized channels? 
Jenny White, a social anthropologist, opens a window into these questions on the basis of 
her ethnographic research at a working-class neighborhood of Istanbul, Umraniye, in the 1980s and 
1990s. She argues that "The classical sense of civil society is little or no use in describing most of 
the non-western world below the level of government and the activities of a segment of educated 
westernized elites" (White, 1996, p.145). 
White  investigates  how and why urban people in  modern Turkey are mobilized around 
Islamic ideals. Her research encourages us to rethink "the terms we use to understand how people 
are mobilized to be active participants in public life" (White, 2002, p.x). The research interestingly 
shows us  that  voluntary association among the  members  of  working class  is  not  necessarily a 
product of contractual associations of unbounded individuals but rather it is a product of shared 
experiences, mutual trust, and the bonds of reciprocity among friends and neighbors. People learn 
citizenship skills through these informal reciprocal associations. In the long run, these forms of 
associations might produce, on the one hand, further institutionalization and politicization and, on 
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the other  hand,  a  more participatory system and accountable  governance  (White,  1996;  White, 
2002).  
A research  which  was  conducted  by  the  Ibn  Khaldun  Center  for  Development  Studies 
shows  a  similar  picture  of  associational  life  in  Egypt.  Accordingly,  there  are  seven  informal 
associations for each formal one in Egypt (Singerman, 2006, p.12). Diane Singerman supports this 
account in her ethnographic research which had been conducted in the mid-1980s and 1990s on the 
politics of lower-income sha‘bi communities at Cairo. 
Singerman argues that the consideration of the place of family and informal networks is a 
must to capture an accurate understanding of the civil society in Egypt. The family and informal 
networks is the critical unit of societal organization to "organize and distribute scarce resources, 
facilitate coordinated actions, and promote public discourse" (2006, p.1). 
It should  be no coincidence that the Middle Eastern societies are replete with various forms 
of informal networks. Most of these networks carry out functions which could legitimately fall 
within  the  concerns  of  liberal  model  of  associations  in  other  parts  of  the  world.  Promoting 
intercultural communication in multicultural societies is an important function of  associations. In 
this  regard,  Suad  Joseph,  a  social  anthropologist,  provides  us  with  an  example  of  informal 
networks,  which attempted to  carry out  this  function,  in  her  ethnography on the working-class 
women's  networks in  Camp Trad, a working-class neighborhood of Greater  Beirut  in  the early 
1970s. 
Joseph (1983) observes that working-class women in Camp Trad created networks cutting 
across Lebanese, Palestinian, Syrian, Christian, Muslim, and other national, religious, ethnic, and 
cultural affiliations. At the instrumental level,  these networks helped to create solidarity among 
different groups of women in an economic sense. At the normative level, they contributed to the 
creation of a "unified, trans-sectarian, cross-ethnic identity and action at a politically turbulent point 
in  time"  (Joseph,  1983,  p.2).  Politically,  inter-sectarian  interactions  of  women  challenged  the 
political authority whose legitimacy was based on sectarianism. This research is also of importance 
to reveal an account of the women's experiences as opposed to the orientalist and sexist biases in 
the literature which frame the "Middle Eastern women as confined to their kin, tribal, ethnic, class, 
or national boundaries; as isolated from men; and as passive actors in the public domain" (Joseph, 
1983, p.2). 
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Alternative forms of civic engagement are not unique to the non-Western societies, though. 
The Western societies have become home to the forms of participation which do not match well 
with the liberal models of civil society. Elizabeth Dunn, a social anthropologist, exemplifies this 
view in her ethnographic research on the American Mormons. Accordingly, American Mormons 
have developed a form of civil society that resembles the forms which might be seen in the non-
Western societies although they are a part of a liberal-individualist society. Dunn argues, "through 
the practice of gifting, and  its powers of social reproduction Mormons make a civil society which 
is not based on private individuals, but rather on a moral system of community interaction" (Dunn, 
1996, p.26). 
The consideration of these cases  urges us to contemplate the implications of applying the 
Western models of civil society in examining the different societies. The researches, based on these 
models, underestimate the idiosyncrasies of different societies and, hence, the different possibilities 
of  human  experiences.  Further  to  that,  this  perspective  precludes  an  understanding  of  the 
experiences of the groups who lack power. In this regard, Fatton asserts, "By generally reflecting 
the lopsided balance of class, ethnic, and sexual powers, the [formal] organizations of civil society 
tend inevitably to privilege the privileged and marginalize the marginalized" (as cited in Singerman, 
2006,  p.13).  Thus,  the  fact  that  some  people  do  not  have  means  to  participate  in  the  formal 
organizations due to the disadvantages of the class, sex, and minority status does not mean that they 
do not involve in organized action or forms of public communication in their own ways.
Thus,  embracing  a  perspective  which  overcomes  these  biases  in  studying  civil  society 
burdens us with three tasks. To this purpose, an inclusive notion of civil society should look for the 
common  principles  governing  human  experiences  around  the  common  themes  such  as  "the 
problems of accountability, trust, and cooperation that all groups face" (Hann, 1996, p.19).  Yet, this 
notion  of  civil  society  should  focus  on  functions  rather  than  structures  (Hudson  as  cited  in 
Schwedler,  1995)  because  structures  may take  different  forms  in  different  societies.  Finally,  a 
broader  understanding of  civil  society may require  us to  diversify the instruments  of research. 
Particularly,  ethnographic research might provide more insight to the study of everyday human 
interactions  and  informal  structures  rather  than  the  research  instruments  such  as  quantitative 
methods or loosely involved qualitative techniques. 
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CHAPTER 3
SOME BACKGROUND ON ALEVILIK
3.1. The Rise of Alevi Identity 
In the changing sociological and political landscape of Turkey, Alevi identity underwent a 
process  of  transformation  in  the  1990s.  This  process  has  been  denominated  in  various  ways: 
"process of rediscovery", "revitalization", "enlightenment", "innovation", "coming out", "revival", 
"remaking", "re-politicization", or even "the explosion of Alevism" (Erdemir, 2005, p.939). There 
are several dimensions to this process of transformation: a great number of publications on Alevi 
identity; a greater visibility in print, visual, and cyber media; the establishment of a great number of  
cemhouses, associations,  foundations, and federations throughout Turkey and Europe; increasing 
willingness of individuals to present themselves as Alevi and increasing participation in the Alevi 
organizations  (Çamuroğlu,  1996,  p.93;  Erdemir,  2005,  pp.939-940).  Thus,  the  presence  and 
visibility of the Alevi community in the public sphere has dramatically increased as a result of this 
process of transformation (Erdemir, 2005). 
In terms of sociological transformation, various processes of modernization in Turkey such 
as migration to the cities, rapid urbanization, and the emergence of an Alevi bourgeoisie have paved 
the way for the "reawakening" of Alevi identity in the 1990s (Çamuroğlu, 1996, pp.94-95; Erman 
and Göker, 2006, pp.99-101). The political transformations of the 1990s both within Turkey and at 
the global scale proved to be a more propelling force in this "reawakening". During the ideological 
confrontation of the cold war, most Alevi subjects identified themselves with socialism. After the 
fall  of  the  socialist  block,  the  Alevi  identity  has  emerged  as  an  alternative  for  the  politically 
disappointed Alevis who are in quest of a new identity (Çamuroğlu, 1996). In the 1990s, the rise of 
political Islam and the Kurdish question  had a direct bearing on the emergent interest in Alevi 
identity. In the face of the rising tide of political Islam, the deep-rooted fear of the Sunni Islam 
urged the Alevi subjects to organize around the Alevi identity (Çamuroğlu, 1996, p.94). In the case 
of the Kurdish Alevis, the burden of the being a Kurd in that turbulent time was moderated by a turn  
towards the Alevi identity (Erman and Göker, 2006, p.100). 
3.2. Defining Alevism
With the "rediscovery" of Alevi identity, the Alevi subjects have begun to redefine what is 
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"true Alevism" or not. Yet, these discussions have created an "image of a chaotic Alevism" because 
very diverse political  and religious orientations in the Alevi community have claimed that their 
definition reflects the essence of Alevism better than any other definition does (Çamuroğlu, 1996, p. 
95).  Faruk Bilici  (1996)  identifies  four  main  schools  within  the  debates  on  the  redefinition  of 
Alevism: Center-Alevism, Alevism as a 'Liberation Theology', Mystical Islamic Alevism, and Shii-
inclined Alevism  (pp.59-60). Each school has been represented on an institutional basis  and the 
definitions of each school are not immune from the political orientations of the members of these 
organizations. 
Center-Alevism has been voiced  by the Cem Vakfı, which is economically and politically 
the most powerful Alevi organization and the most popular among the Alevi subjects (Bilici, 1996; 
Erman and Göker). This school views Alevism as a part of Islam, which is "a secularized version of 
Islam"(Erman and Göker, 2006). The proponents of this school strive to establish Alevism as an 
institutionalized  religion.  To  this  purpose,  their  political  efforts  are  intended  to  force  the  state 
authorities to ensure the Alevi representation within the Directorate of Religious Affairs and equal 
financial support for the affairs of Alevi community as opposed to the other Alevi organisations that 
support the total eradication of the Directorate of Religious Affairs on the basis of the principle of 
secularism. The proponents of this school politically espouse Kemalism, the Republican regime, and 
Social Democratic policies (Erman and Göker, 2006, pp.111-112). 
Alevism as a 'Liberation Theology   is the second most powerful school within the Alevi 
community, voiced by the former left-leaning intellectuals, in the circle of the Pir Sultan Abdal  
Cultural Associations (Erman and Göker, 2006, p.110). The two most distinctive characteristics of 
this group are their construction of Alevism as "a type of Marxist-Alevi theology" that resembles to 
the liberation theology of the 1970s and 80s in Latin America and a syncretic understanding of 
Alevism (Bilici, 1996). The following passage summarizes the vision of this school: 
The way of life of the Alevi in Turkey resembles the way of life in no other  Islamic 
country.  It  resembles  neither the Shi’a of Arabia and Iran,  nor of Libya and Egypt. 
Anatolian Alevism displays a quite individual structure, having adopted an Alevite form 
after coming under the influence of all the various cultures that had previously existed 
in  the  region.  Of  these  may  be  mentioned  Zoroastrianism,  Christianity  and  Islam. 
Nevertheless, it has fused with none of these… It is a movement which, in struggles 
between the oppressors and the oppressed, has always sided with the latter… Alevism is 
situated neither totally within nor totally outside the religion of Islam (as cited in Bilici,  
p.60).
The influence of other two schools among the Alevi subjects is insignificant. While the Shii-
inclined  Alevism is  highly  influenced  by  the  Iranian  Shiism,  the  Mystical  Islamic  Alevism is 
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distinguished by its overemphasis on the principles of the Sufi tradition (Erman and Göker, 2006).
Therefore,  considering  a  plethora  of  interpretations,  it  can  be  safely  argued  that  the 
interpretation of Alevism is not a monolithic entity (Okan, 2004). As Erman and Göker (2006) point 
out, "within  Alevi  politics,  different  groups  constantly  produce  definitions  both  for  "other" 
Alevilik(s) and for themselves, trying to establish a monopoly over the right definition" (p.113).
 
3.3.The Construction of Cemhouses 
One of the the most visible signs of the Alevi "revival" in the public sphere has been the 
construction of cemhouses. Cemhouses simply refer to the places where the cem ritual of Alevism is 
performed. Historically, the cem ritual was mostly performed in the houses of dedes or one of the 
community members whose place was available to host the village population or open air spaces 
(Es, 2006, pp.9-10). The configuration of a special place for the performance of the cem ritual is 
rather a new phenomenon. The cemhouses have begun to appear in the urban space from the early 
1990s on (Es, 2006, p.6). 
Nevertheless,  the  status  of  the  cemhouses  is  ambivalent.  Regarding  the  status  of  the 
cemhouses, there are ongoing debates that revolve around whether they are culture centers or places 
of worship. These two frames are used interchangeably by different Alevi and non-Alevi actors in 
different contexts for different purposes (Es, 2006, p.7). In the official discourse, cemhouses have 
implied the places of culture through the rhetoric of kültür evi (cem and culture house), cem kültür  
evi (cem culture house), or Alevi kültür merkezi (Alevi culture center). This is because the status of 
place of worship is denied to the cemhouses. They are legally allowed to be constructed as culture 
centers (Es, 2006, pp.6-7). 
The rhetoric of culture is not only a legal imposition, though. The Alevi subjects are also 
ambivalent in their view of the cemhouses. Its meaning is context-driven in the discourses of the 
Alevi subjects. While in some places it refers to the place where the cem ritual is performed, in 
some  other  places  it  is  used  to  indicate  the  whole  space  where  people  involve  in  the  social, 
religious, and cultural interactions (Es, 2006, p.7). In this study, I will use the phrase "place of faith" 
rather than "cemhouse" since the participants themselves call the place in this way owing to the fact 
that cemhouse is only one part of the whole shrine.
3.4. The Context of the Micro-Study: The Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı1 
1 http://www.sahkulu.com/   
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This study is endeavored to scrutinize various social relationships within a particular Alevi 
place  of  faith.  This  is  the  Şahkulu  Sultan  Dergahı.  It  is  distinguished  from the  other  recently 
constructed  cemhouses  by its  being  a  historical  space  of  Bektashi  belief.  The  Şahkulu  Sultan 
Dergahı2 had been established in the last quarter of the fourteenth century by one of those Khorasan 
dervishes, Şahkulu Sultan, who was entitled to disseminate the principles of the Bektashi order to 
the people of the newly conquered lands. During the Ottoman Empire, it functioned as a Bektashi 
Shrine. When it comes to the Republic, it was closed down by the law on the closure of  religious 
convents and dervish lodges in 1925. Despite the various efforts, the Dergah could not escape to fall 
into ruin until it was restored and brought into its current outlook by the Association in 1985. Today, 
the Dergah continues to work under the auspices of the Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı Mehmet Ali Hilmi  
Dedebaba Araştrma Eğitim ve Kültür Vakfı in Merdivenköy, Göztepe, Istanbul. 
Currently, the Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı carries out some services which fall into the fields of 
faith, education, and culture. The religious services are the primary functions of the Shrine. To this 
purpose, the Shrine involves one cemhouse where the weekly cem rituals are performed; one dining 
hall where a particular meal, lokma, having a special importance in the Alevi belief, is serviced to 
the followers; and mausoleums of prominent figures of the Bektashi order where people visit and 
pray. 
The  educational  services  also  occupy  a  significant  place  in  the  agenda  of  the  Dergah, 
covering both religious and mundane education. The  Dergah opens the weekly courses in which 
Alevi  and  non-Alevi  academics  and  authors  give  talks  on  Alevism with  regard  to  its  diverse 
dimensions  such  as  its  theology,  history,  philosophy,  and literature.  Apart  from that,  the  Wakf 
administration  opens  courses  on  literacy,  playing  musical  instruments,  semah,  computer  skills, 
apiculture, and arts and crafts. Furthermore, the Wakf administration accommodates a library that 
involves rich sources on Alevism. The last but not the least important service of the Shrine is to 
provide scholarships for the university students and encourage graduate students who are intended 
to make research on Alevism. The Wakf has also begun to build a culture and accommodation 
center for the university students with the assistance of the donations. Finally, the Sahkulu Sultan 
Dergahı accommodates  a  Women's  Commission  and  Youth  Commission  which  are  informal 
autonomous spaces in the Shrine where the Alevi women and Alevi youth organize themselves, 
socialize, deliberate their common concerns, and take action, and make networks outside the Shrine. 
The experiences of the Youth Commission constitute the subject matter of this thesis. 
2 http://www.sahkulu.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83:tarhce&catid=6:tarihce&Itemid=11   
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CHAPTER 4
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
4.1. Opening the Space for Counter Discursive Interaction: Subaltern Counter Publics
This study theoretically rests on Cohen and Arato's conceptualization of civil society, which 
is elaborated in their voluminous book Civil Society and Political Theory. The Habermasian notion 
of communicative action constitutes the core of their tripartite model in that they theorize civil 
society as a contemporary emancipatory project (Cohen and Arato, 1994). 
The  lifeworld/system distinction in Habermasian theory is  central  to an understanding of 
Cohen and Arato's  conception (1994,  pp.427-433).  Accordingly,  system refers  to  economic  and 
administrative  systems  which  work  towards  the  material  reproduction  of  society  through 
instrumental actions of individuals which are based on an instrumental rationality.  On the other 
hand,  lifeworld  refers to the everyday world which we share with others on the basis of shared 
meanings  and understandings.  The  lifeworld consists  of  three components:  society,  culture,  and 
personality. The  lifeworld works towards social integration, which is based on a communicative 
rationality. Thus, civil society is grounded on the society component of the  lifeworld  (Cohen and 
Arato, 1994). 
 
In the light of this introduction, Cohen and Arato define civil society as "a sphere of social 
interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the 
family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms 
of public communication" (1994, p.ix). Thus, civil society stands out against the "colonization of 
the lifeworld" by the administrative and economic systems. Yet, this definition is not intended to 
include all social life which remains between the state and economy, as Cohen and Arato stated 
(1994,  p.ix).  The  actors  of  political  society  (political  parties,  political  organizations,  and 
parliaments) and the actors of economic society (organizations of production and distribution, firms, 
cooperatives,  partnerships,  and so on) remain outside of civil  society.  This is because the logic 
governing  the  actions  of  these  actors  is  based  on  an  instrumental  rationality  which  strives  to 
"control and manage". However, the institutions of civil society are governed by a communicative 
rationality. In other words, as Cohen and Arato asserted, "The political role of civil society...is not  
directly related to the control or conquest of power but to the generation of influence through the 
life of democratic associations and unconstrained discussion in the cultural public sphere" (1994, 
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pp.ix-x).
According to Cohen and Arato (1994), only those structures of the lifeworld that accomplish 
the functions of socialization, conscious association and self-organization, and organized forms of 
public communication,  on the way to being institutionalized, can be qualified as a part of civil 
society  (p.x).  These  structures  of  the  lifeworld-socialization,  association,  and  public 
communication-have been embodied in the notion of public sphere. In Habermasian theory, the idea 
of public sphere implies that a body of "private persons" assembled to discuss matters of "public  
concern" or "common interest" (Fraser,1992, p.112). These publics are strived to achieve "an ideal 
of unrestricted rational discussion of public matters" which is open and accessible to all regardless 
of "inequalities of status" (Fraser, 1992 , p.113). 
Public sphere is an independent space from the state, where "production and circulation of 
critical  discourses of the state" take place (Fraser,  1992, p.110).  In other words, public spheres 
mediate between society and state by holding the state accountable to society via publicity (Fraser, 
p.112). At the same time, public sphere is independent from the space of economic processes. As 
Fraser stated that "it is not an arena of market relations but rather one of discursive relations, a  
theater for debating and deliberating rather than for buying and selling" (Fraser, p.111). Thus,  the 
public  sphere  in  Habermasian  terms  is  an  "institutionalized  arena  of  (free,  open,  and tolerant) 
discursive interaction" independent of  both state and economy (Fraser, p.110). 
A number  of  scholars  have  criticized  the  Habermasian  notion  of  public  sphere  on  the 
ground that the ideal of free rational debate between equals has never become a reality (Benhabib,  
1992; Eley, 1992; Fraser, 1992; Ryan, 1992). The liberal conception of public sphere has always 
been based on the exclusions of those who lack power. Fraser (1992) argues that because of their 
exclusion  from  the  bourgeois  public  sphere,  "members  of  subordinated  social  groups-women, 
workers, peoples of color, and gays and lesbians-have repeatedly found it advantageous to constitute 
alternative publics" (p.123).  Fraser (1992) called these alternative publics as "subaltern counter 
publics". 
Grounded  on  Cohen  and  Arato's  framework  of  civil  society,  this  study  interprets  the 
workings of empirical case specifically through the theory of "subaltern counter publics" whose 
basic foundations were laid down by Nancy Fraser, a feminist critical theorist. 
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4.2. Democratizing Counter Publics: Civility and Self-limitation
        
Some scholars argue that counter publics have an emancipatory power for the members of 
the unprivileged groups who are not able to participate in the discursive interaction because of their 
exclusion  on  various  grounds  (Benhabib,  1992;  Eley,  1992;  Fraser,  1992;  Ryan,  1992).  These 
counter spaces allow them to formulate and circulate their own discourses. Yet, they are not always 
democratic  and  egalitarian  (Fraser,  p.124).  Counter  publics  might  become  a  part  of  power 
asymmetries in itself. Or, repression might be seen as a way of dealing with internal or external 
differences. For that reason, a consideration of these dimensions is crucial if counter publics are to 
yield an emancipatory force. As Göle (1997) pointed out that "The 'rise of the oppressed' can be 
emancipatory only if it is not itself repressive" (p.5). 
       
In order to shed light on the democratic potential of counter publics, this study combines 
the organized form of public communication with the notions of civility and self-limitation. With 
regard to this, Akman's "social orientations perspective" provides us with a systematic framework to 
analyze the normative dimension of civil society. Akman (2012) defines civility "as social actors’ 
willingness  for  non-repressive  engagement  with  others  in  political  and  cultural  contestation" 
(p.334). Similarly,  in Norton's thought, "civility implies tolerance, the willingness of individuals to 
accept disparate political views and social attitudes; to accept the profoundly important idea that 
there is no right answer" (1993, p.214). In brief, civility is "willingness to live and let live" (1993, 
p.214). Yet, Akman adds another dimension to the principle of civility. In his view, civility as "a  
norm, a value, an abstract moral commitment" is not sufficient alone. It needs to be combined with a 
mode of practice. This is the notion of self-limitation (2012, p.14). Therefore, this study is intended 
to scrutinize the social actors' predisposition to civility and self-limitation through three dimensions: 
mode of engagement with the state authority, opponents, and members.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ALEVI YOUTH IN THE DERGAH : A SUBALTERN COUNTER PUBLIC
5.1. Introduction
The  discursive model of public space epitomizes the political ideal of open, inclusive, and 
effective deliberation about matters of common and critical concern (Ryan, 1992,  p.259). Some 
aspects of this public sphere scheme, in its Habermasian articulation, have received much criticism 
(Benhabib,  1992;  Eley,  1992;  Fraser,  1992;  Ryan,  1992).  Most  importantly,  scholars  have 
questioned the historical accuracy of the claims to openness and accessibility and the idealization of 
a  singular  "liberal  model  of  the bourgeois  public  sphere"  and the  portrayal  of  this  model  as  a 
historically specific development in the early modern era of the Western Europe (Benhabib, 1992; 
Eley, 1992; Fraser, 1992; Ryan, 1992).  
A revisionist  understanding of  historiography would  posit  that  the  ideal  of  participatory 
parity in the public sphere has never turned into reality because power asymmetries among the 
possible constituencies of the public have been treated as if they did not exist (Fraser, 1992, p.113). 
Thus, as Eley points out,  "its elitism blocked and consciously repressed possibilities of broader 
participation/emancipation" (Eley, 1992, p.306). 
The act of public deliberation in the early representations of public sphere belonged to those 
who were the educated, the propertied, and the masculine (Fraser, 1992). Yet, it produced some 
silences. It was the silence of those who were underprivileged on the basis of the status of gender,  
property,  subordinate ethnic identity, and so on (Fraser, 1992).  
Eley (1992) argues that "the actual pursuit of communicative rationality via the modalities of 
the  public  sphere  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  reveals  a  far  richer  social  history  than 
Habermas' conception of a specifically bourgeois emancipation allows" (p.330). Various narratives 
of the revisionist historiography suggest that from the very beginning of the societal interactions, 
members of subordinated groups have problematized the various sorts of power relations, embedded 
in the dominant public sphere, and created "points of access" to the comprehensive public sphere 
(Ryan,  1992,  p.283).  Historically,  women,  members  of  working-class,  peasantry,  subordinate 
nationalities,  peoples  of  color,  and  homosexuals  have  attempted  to  construct  their  autonomous 
spaces of deliberation and action and taken their grievances, once being a part of the their private 
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space, into the public (Ryan, 1992, p.260).  
Looking from this angle, alternative publics seem to have an emancipatory power in terms of 
narrowing down the gap in participatory disparity between dominant and subordinate groups in 
society (Fraser, 1992, p.122). Many scholars agree that the incorporation of marginalized groups 
into the public sphere through the construction of alternative autonomous spaces has been a positive 
development in dealing with the limits of contemporary democracies in terms of ensuring open and 
inclusive processes of deliberation (Benhabib, 1992; Eley, 1992; Fraser, 1992; Ryan, 1992). 
Fraser  calls  these alternative publics  "subaltern counter  publics",  by which she refers  to 
"parallel  discursive  arenas  where  members  of  subordinated  social  groups  invent  and  circulate 
counter discourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs" 
(Fraser, p.123). 
           
Göle, travelling across non-Western societies with the notion of public sphere, points out that 
it neither finely resembles nor completely diverges from the Western models but rather it becomes 
subjected to a "continuous alteration by a field of cultural meanings and social practices" (2002, 
p.176). In keeping with this, Göle argues for the Turkish context that "the implementation of a 
secular and progressive way of life" lies at the center of the efforts to construct a public sphere in 
Republican Turkey (2002, pp.176-177). Moreover, it is some sort of authoritarian modernism that 
has governed these efforts  in contrast  to the Western model  of public  sphere in which rather a 
bourgeois and individualist liberalism has been the driving force (Göle, 2002, pp.176-177). 
As opposed to the discursive model of public sphere in the West, rooted in the principles of 
universal access and openness, its counterpart  in Turkey had been constructed as a state-centric 
model of public sphere (Çaha, 2005; Çolak, 2008; Göle, 2002; Roy, 2006). The defining feature of 
the early Turkish public sphere was its being rested on significant exclusionary mechanisms. As the 
public  sphere  was  imagined  as  a  secular,  national,  and  manly  space,  it  inevitably  led  to  the 
alienation of some segments in society (Çaha, 2005; Çolak, 2008; Göle, 2002; Roy, 2006). 
Nevertheless,  the  historically  alienated  groups  of  the  Republic-Islamists,  Kurds,  Alevis, 
feminists,  and  some  others-have  begun  to  problematize  these  structured  power  relations  and 
challenge the boundaries of the public sphere in the post-1980 era (Çaha, 2005; Çolak, 2008; Göle, 
2002; Roy, 2006). With their efforts, the issues, once being confined to their private realms such as 
religious freedoms, collective rights of ethnic groups, and issues of sexuality,  have begun to be 
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discussed within the context of concerns of common interest. 
Within this process of reconstruction of public sphere, the struggle of the Alevi community 
might  be  seen as  a  powerful  example of  the  incorporation  of  a  subordinate  identity to  the the 
comprehensive public sphere. Owing to the changes brought by the "Alevi revival" in the 1990s, the 
members  of  the  Alevi  community have  successfully  constructed  a  counter  public  of  their  own 
through  associational  activities,  journals,  demonstrations  and  other  engagements  in  the  public 
sphere  (Erdemir,  2005).  Since  then,  the  Alevi  community has  succeeded in  incorporating  their 
concerns into the public agenda and has therewith come to be accepted as an important societal 
actor by political authorities. 
This study is concerned with unveiling some of the dynamics shaping the forms of public 
communication within the Alevi counter public. The emphasis is on the pursuit of the vestiges of the 
communicative action via the modalities of counter public within a small fragment of the Alevi  
public, that is, the Alevi youth of Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı in Istanbul. 
         
The argument I put forward is that the Şahkulu youth has successfully constructed a counter 
public within the Dergah to formulate their oppositional interpretations of Alevi identity and their 
grievances with regard to the unjust participatory privileges enjoyed by the people in power position 
while simultaneously constructing itself as an embryonic counter public vis-à-vis the general Alevi 
counter public. In other words, this is a story of the Alevi youth's efforts to construct  a counter  
public within a counter public. The youth has successfully constructed a counter public within the 
Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı notwithstanding the fact that it  represents only an embryonic formation 
within the broader Alevi community. 
5.2.The Youth as a Category of Analysis
The subject matter of this study is the experiences of the Alevi youth in the context of a 
politics of place. However, a study of  the youth requires us to contemplate what it means to be 
"young". In the scholarly literature, the notion has often been conceptualized as a universal stage in 
human development (Swedenburg, 2007, p.4). This stage demographically refers to the period 15 to 
24 years (Swedenburg, 2007, p.4), -which is usually associated with "a series of developmental 
stages involving mental, physical and psychological maturation that all people are assumed to go 
through" (Boratav, 2005, p.203). 
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Other  scholars,  however,  have  suggested  that  the  youth  category  itself  is  "a  social 
construction interwoven with modernity,  societal  structures and the process of individualization 
(Morch, 2003 as cited in Demir, 2012). This genre of constructivist scholarship emphasizes "the 
heterogeneity of the experience and the meaning of what it means to be "young" under various 
circumstances" through exploring, for instance, "how young people construct their identities in the 
context of family relations, institutional experiences and social and economic circumstances" (Wyn 
and White,  1997,  pp.148-149 as cited in  in  Boratav,  2005).  Therefore,  viewing the youth as  a 
"socially and culturally determined category" (Swedenburg, 2007) requires us to accept that the 
construction of youth and the experiences of youth are driven by the contextual idiosyncracies 
(Demir, 2012). In other words, the youth cannot be reduced to a neutral demographic term.  
        
In the Turkish case, the youth image has meant different things in different time periods. 
Neyzi (2001) examines the construction of youth in public discourse of  Turkey at three periods: the 
1923-50  period,  1950-80  period,  and  post-1980  period.  In  the  first  period  (1923-50),  the 
construction of the youth cannot be absracted from the state of society which had just  left behind 
the War of Liberation and strived to form and consolidate a new regime. In this context, the youth  
was viewed as "guardians of the regime". Neyzi (2001) maintains that "Young people were central 
to the ideology of Turkish nationalism because the goal of the regime was to create a new type of  
person with  a  new mind-set,  imbued with the values  of  the Republic  and freed of  what  were  
perceived as 'the shackles of tradition' " (pp.416-417).  In the following period (1950-80), the youth 
in Turkey became highly politicized and polarized between the leftist and the rightist camps as a 
part of the politicized youth movements in the world (Lüküslü, 2009, p.114). As a consequence, the 
image of a rebellious youth became the prevalent characterization in the public discourse (Neyzi, 
2001,  p.426).  Neyzi  (2001) comments  that  "Despite  a  change in  discourses  on youth,  the  two 
historical periods  discussed represent a continuity in a  historical tradition in which youth were 
educated to protect the state-even from itself" (p.422). 
        
In the context of the politicized youth movements of the 1960s and 1970s, various scholars 
posit that, in a time of urbanization, the Alevi youth did not remain indifferent to the influence of 
political movements of the period and became an active part of the socialist movements in this era 
(Çamuroğlu,  2008;  Okan,  2004;  Özmen,  2011).  Bozarslan  explains  that  socialism gained wide 
currency among  the  Alevis  due  to  them being  economically  underdeveloped  and  experiencing 
socio-religious discrimination (Bozarslan, 1997, p.180, as cited in Özmen, 2011, p.47). 
     
The construction of the youth in the post-1980 period has been referred to "the first serious 
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rupture with modernist constructions of the youth in Turkey" (Neyzi, 2001, p.412). The coup of  
1980 constituted a milestone for the youth (Lüküslü,  2009; Neyzi,  2001), in that-the following 
social, political, and economical transformations have been conducive to the production of a new 
type of youth (Demir, 2012,  p.98). Neyzi (2001) explains the changing picture as follows: 
The expression "turning the corner" is commonly used to characterize the ethos of the 
post-1980  period,  evoking  images  of  the  wanton  display  of  "private"  lives  and 
consumption-oriented  lifestyles  in  the  age  of  media  and  economic  liberalization 
accompanied by widespread corruption and the private use of public resources...Given 
the cultural weight of both the Republican and 1968 generations in the public sphere, 
members of the generation known as the "Ozal generation"' or the "post-1980 gener-
ation" tend to be represented as selfish, individualistic consumers, implying the lack of a 
sense of collective responsibility (pp.423-24). 
Recent studies on youth further argue that a great deal of political apathy and low levels of political  
participation and civic engagement have characterized many members of the post-1980 generation 
(Lüküslü, 2009, p.146). 
In spite of this general state of being among the post-1980 generation, Neyzi points out some 
new developments taking place among some segments of the youth. She argues that 
Today,  young  people  are  increasingly  able  to  express  themselves  through  the  new 
media,  challenging  their  construction  in  public  discourse,  the  established  hierarchy 
between elders and juniors, and the mission imposed on them by adult society. This 
suggests that the construction of age in Turkish society may be changing in the current 
period...At the same time, the exclusion of young people from established institutional 
spaces  has  resulted  in  the  creation  of  alternative  spaces  and  forms  of  political 
mobilization (Neyzi, 2001, pp.426-27).
         
Given the lack of any significant work examining the lifeworld of the Alevi youth in the post-
1980 period, it is one of the tasks of this study to fill this empirical blindspot. In particular, I do so 
by inquiring  into  how the  Alevi  youth  has  constructed  itself  through various  practices  in   the 
context of "the hierarchy between elders and juniors and the mission imposed on them by adult  
society" (Neyzi, 2001, p.426). This question will be addressed along the general research endeavor 
of investigating the Alevi youth's performatives of constructing "alternative spaces and alternative 
forms of participation" within an environment of exclusion by "established institutional spaces" 
(Neyzi, 2001, p.427).  
5.3. The Emergence of the Youth's Space: The Şahkulu Youth Commission
The organized presence of the young in Dergah goes back to the early 1990s. The Şahkulu 
youth began to gather under the roof of the Youth Commission when the Dergah was first renovated 
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by the Şahkulu Sultan Association. Then, it continued its existence under the same roof when the 
administration of the Dergah passed into the Şahkulu Sultan Foundation. 
Cohen and Arato argues that "modern civil society is created through forms of self-creation 
and self-mobilization" (1992, p.ix). Following this  assumption,  the first  thing to  inquire  into is 
whether the association of the Şahkulu Youth is an example of self-creation or, rather, its creation is 
an initiative of the Şahkulu Administration. 
The  manager  of  the  Foundation,  I.  U.  (52),  stated  that  the  Youth  Commission  was 
established  simultaneously  with  the  establishment  of  the  Association  by  the  initiative  of  the 
administration. She stated that: 
The construction of the Youth and Women Commissions is a tradition among the Alevi 
institutions from the very beginning. Even the village associations have these sorts of 
commissions. It was present even at the first Alevi association, Divriği Kültür Derneği, 
which was established in 1946. These forms of structures are not only a part of the 
associational activity in Turkey but also a part of the Alevi institutions in Germany3. 
One of the former members of the Şahkulu Youth Commission, D.Z. (30), with a background in the 
youth branch of  the Pir Sultan Abdal Association, also confirmed this statement. He stated that:
When a new Alevi institution is established, the administration assigns the formation of 
the commission to the young who have already developed some networks of friendship 
there. Then, the commissions begin to operate as the sub-branches of the institutions4. 
The statements indicate that the organization of the youth in most  Alevi institutions do not depend 
on an independent action by the youth itself, including the Şahkulu Youth. This is of course not to 
say that the youth has never acquired an independent status. 
Neyzi (2001) argues that the  youth image in Turkey at different time periods was "burdened 
by the weight passed on by previous generations"(p.412). The same is true for the treatment of the  
Alevi youth in the Alevi community. The accounts of a former study regarding the Alevi youth and 
organizations, whose sample included a much wider population of the Alevi young from different 
3 Translated into English from original: "Her yerde ama her yerde, bütün kurumlarımızın içinde var. 
Köy derneklerimizde bile var şu an. Mesela Divriği Kültür Derneği 1946'da kurulan ilk dernekmiş 
orada da varmış. Bu bir gelenektir. Sadece burada değil Avrupadaki örgütlenme yapısı içerisinde de 
bunlar var. Mesela geçen Almanya’dan bir grup genç gelmişti. Onların da gençlik kolları var."
4 Translated  into  English  from  original:  "Bu  kurumlarda  gençlik  komisyonu  şöyle  kuruluyor 
bildiğim  kadarıyla.  Bundan  önce  ben  Pir  Sultan  Abdal  Derneği'ndeydim  Şahkulu  Dergahına 
gelmeden  önce  ordaydım.  Şimdi  oradaki  yeni  bir  dernek  kurulduğunda  alt  organları  olarak 
kuruluyor.  Bir  kurum oluşuyor,  gençler  gelip  gitmeye  başlıyor  ve  yönetim kurulu  diyor  ki  siz 
gençlik komisyonu kurun diyip belli kişileri..evet yani kendiliğinden oluşmuş birliktelik var zaten 
orda arkadaşlık çerçevesinde ilişkiler çerçevesinde. Daha sonra o görev veriliyor."
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institutions,  reflect  a  rough  image  of  the  youth  in  the  most  Alevi  institutions  (Ezgin,  2009). 
Accordingly, the objectification of the youth characterizes the way in which the Alevi adults in 
position of power tend to view the youth. In other words, young people have a place as long as they 
perform the  assumed roles,  drawn by the  people  in  power who are  very often  from the  older  
generations (Ezgin, 2009). 
In this imagination, the rationale behind the construction of the Youth Commissions is to 
prevent the disappearance of tradition by encouraging  passing down the principles of the Alevi 
identity to  the younger  generations  and creating a  bond of  solidarity among  the young Alevi  
(Ezgin,  2009).  However,  in this  picture,  the tradition conveyed is  the adult’s  interpretation and 
construction.  At this point, the youth expresses their grievances with regard to the state of not being 
very well received of their efforts to engage in philosophical interpretations of their own (Ezgin, 
2009, pp.99-100). 
The narratives of the youth in Ezgin's study also show that the young are disproportionately 
represented within the Alevi institutions (Ezgin, 2009). On the one hand, the expectations from the 
administrations of the young is to carry out service work such as food delivery, funeral services, and 
some  other  labor-intensive  works,  socialization  activities  for  the  purpose  of  creating  ties  of 
solidarity among the young Alevis and performance of the religious rituals. On the other hand, the 
young are not allowed to engage in decision making process at the higher level. Furthermore, in 
most institutions, the composition of the Youth Commission is altered with the each new coming 
administration since each administration wants to work with the young who will assist them at the 
workings of the institutions.  Thus,  in general,  the Alevi youth seem to become a long way off 
asserting themselves as autonomous subjects neither in the general public sphere nor in the Alevi 
community. 
          
Given this reality within the Alevi community, the Şahkulu Youth is distinguished from most 
of  its  counterparts  notwithstanding  the  fact,  however,  that  the  very  formation  of  the  Youth 
Commission in  Şahkulu followed a similar process of commissioning from above. Different from 
other communal groups, though, the Şahkulu youth has succeeded to create an autonomous space of 
their own since its founding almost two decades ago. The young have refused to work as a shadow 
of the administrations although this has come at the expense of a series of confrontations with the 
central of authorities in the Dergah. As opposed to the situation in many other Alevi institutions, the 
composition of the Youth Commission in Şahkulu has never been influenced by the rotations in the 
administrations. The  Şahkulu youth has always preserved its autonomous status even in times of its 
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annulment. B.U. (35), one of the oldest and the most vocal members of the Youth Commission,  
stated  that  they  owe  their  current  autonomous  status  in  the  Dergah to  their  adherence  to  the 
principle of "being nobody's man". Complying with this principle has ensured them an autonomous 
platform in the Dergah whereby they have operated the processes of deliberation to problematize 
existing  power  hierarchies,  to  construct  an  authentic  voice  on  the  issues  regarding  the  Alevi 
community and to  draw attention  and coordinate  action  in  regard  to   issues  of  general  public 
concern.
5.4. Exclusion, Self-Mobilization, Institutionalization, and Going Beyond the Dergah
In  relation  to  the  dimensions  of  self-creation  and  self-mobilization  in  civil  society 
associations, Cohen and Arato (1992) argue that 
It is institutionalized and generalized through laws, and especially subjective rights, 
that  stabilize  social  differentiation.  While  the  self-creative  and  institutionalized 
dimensions  can  exist  separately,  in  the  long  term  both  independent  action  and 
institutionalization are necessary for the reproduction of civil society (p.ix). 
In this context, a scrutiny of the history of the Şahkulu Youth yields an example of how an 
informal  network evolves into an association which is  grounded in an institutional structure.  In 
general, the Youth Commissions in Alevi institutions do not possess a formal status as the Şahkulu 
Youth does not have in the Dergah. In the Şahkulu's statute, there is no reference to the status of the 
Youth Commission. In connection with this, the Youth Commission is not viewed as an entity which 
is to be represented in the decision-making bodies. The very consequence of this informal status for 
the youth is that their existence often faces the risk of being subjected to the arbitrary decisions of  
administrations. They have to receive approval of the administrators for their actions. In the case 
that the young behave in contradistinction to the orientations of the decision makers, the existence 
of the Youth Commission  is imperiled. 
The  history  of  the  Youth's  associational  activity  in  Alevi  community  is  replete  with 
examples of suppression and exclusion. Many members of the youth commissions in various Alevi 
institutions who were critical of practices of administrations and dedes were dismissed from their 
institutions. In response, the youth commissions of the eight Alevi institutions mobilized against the 
suppression  of  dissidence  within  their  institutions.  Their  self-mobilization  was  embodied  and 
institutionalized  in the establishment of  The Alevi Bektashi Youth Platform (Alevi Bektaşi Gençlik  
Platformu) in 20055. 
5 http://www.agep.gen.tr/   
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D.Z. (30), who was involved in the early process of  its formation, explained the rationale 
behind the formation of AGEP: 
In general, there is a widespread problem in Alevi shrines, associations, foundations, 
and cemhouses. Each institution wants to form the youth of their own. If the youth 
becomes critical of their stances and practices, they dismiss these young people and 
they replace them with the young who support their policies. Our rationale to form this 
platform was to discuss about our common problems, raise our voices and objections 
against  these  arbitrary  practices  of  exclusions,  and  coordinate  our  efforts  to  take 
common action6. 
D.Z.  also  pointed  out  that  the  formation  of  platforms  is  a  widespread  tendency  in  the  Alevi 
community. However, the young are disproportionately represented in these platforms as well. He 
said:
These sorts of initiatives are a tradition in Alevi community. The administrations of the 
Alevi institutions have often formed platforms. Yet, they do not reach the lay people. 
The members of the administrations and chair persons gather, make meetings, and take 
decisions.  Nevertheless,  the young in Alevi  community have not  engaged in these 
forms of organizations so far7. 
 AGEP emerged as the first association as such among the Alevi youth. It functions as a 
formal non-governmental organization and embodies the proper procedural qualifications of formal 
structures.  This  is  well  reflected  in  the  fact  that  it  has  its  own bureau,  website,  declaration  of 
principles, official membership lists, formal procedures regulating the workings, and a formal name 
under which the members can organize meetings and release press statements. Currently, although it 
is active in name and in website, the members lack a physical space of their own owing to the 
economic deprivations. This point needs a special consideration because it suggests that acquiring 
an average  degree  of  institutionalization  is  not  immune from power asymmetries  embedded in 
society.  For  instance,  the  class  status  of  the  people  might  posit  an  obstacle  before 
institutionalization.  This occurs  in spite of the fact that they fulfill the most essential requirements  
6 Translated  into  English  from  original:  "Genel  olarak  Alevi  dergahlarında,  derneklerinde, 
cemevlerinde her yönetim kurulunun kendine göre bir gençlik komisyonu var ya da beğenmediği 
yani  fikirlerine  karşı  çıktığı  ya  da  sorun yaşadığı  gençlik  komisyonunu direk  dışarı  itip  ya  da 
kendisine  yakın  olan  gençlik komisyonunu,  gençleri  daha doğrusu gençlik komisyonuna atıyor, 
atama usülü yapıyor yani. Bunu yaşadık ne yapalım hani bunların da temsilcisi olmak bunlarla ilgili 
de konuşabilmek, sonuçta daha ortak bir platform kurulması gerektiğini ya da işte platformun bu 
noktada  da  eylemde  bulunması,  faaliyette  bulunması  gerektiğini  düşündük.  Yani  bir  platform 
denince bizim aklımıza gelen tanım şu oluyor: ortak bir şekilde sesimizi birleştirip daha gür çıkmak 
ya da işte ortak şeyler yapmak ya da hani varsa tehlikeler onlara karşı da ortak bir ses çıkarmak,  
ortak tavır almak şeklinde…"
7 Translated into English from original: "Böyle girişimler daha öncesinde vardı. Yani bu gelenek 
olarak var. Dedim ya üst yapıların ortak örgütlenmeleri var ama bunun tabana yayılması söz konusu 
değil.  Yani ortak eylemleri ne şekilde oluyor? Yönetim kurulu üyeleri ya da başkanlar bir araya 
geliyor ve onlar kendilerince orda bir toplantı yapıyor, karar alıyor. Bizim burada bir birlikteliğimiz 
yok, gençlerin böyle bir şeyi yok."
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of being a civil society actor, which are particularly organized communication and the toleration of 
differences.  Therefore,  it  shall  not  be  inaccurate  to  argue  that  too  much  focus  on  the 
institutionalized dimensions of civil society actors reflect a class-bias. 
5.5. The Youth Commission: A Space of Socialization
According to Cohen and Arato (1992), although civil society actors fall into a space between 
state and economy, there are restrictions on qualifying every form of association as a part of civil 
society.  In  this  regard,  they  argue  that  "Civil  society  refers  to  the  structures  of  socialization, 
association and organized forms of communication of the lifeworld to the extent that these are 
institutionalized or are in the process of being institutionalized" (1992, p.x). 
To begin with the socialization function of civil society actors, there is an immense literature 
showing  that  people  who  are  members  of  civil  society  institutions  go  through  a  process  of  
socialization (Talpin, 2007). These institutions help to bring "strangers" together by turning them 
into  "alike".  Through  encouraging  recurrent  face-to-face  interactions,  voluntary  associations 
instigate to construct strong social ties and shape individuals' identities (Talpin, 2007). 
The  Şahkulu Youth  Commission  provides  an   illustrative  case  of  the  provision  of  a 
secondary source of socialization for young people. For many, the Youth Commission emerges as 
the first space of sociability and associability after their families and schools. Most of the people 
with whom I spoke began to take part in the Commission from the very early years of their life,  
particularly the years of high school or even primary school. Their first contact with the  Dergah 
started with their participation in semah and bağlama lessons, given by the members of the Youth 
Commission. Their narratives reveal that participation in these courses allowed them to meet face-
to-face with the other Alevi fellows, to enjoy pleasure of dancing and doing music together and to  
create strong bonds of friendship. Moreover, people in their very young ages get sense of what it  
means to be a part a collectivity by taking responsibilities. Participation in  semah and  bağlama 
courses fuels the newcomers to participate in the Youth Commission.  The social  ties developed 
during the attention of these lessons evolve into more strong personal relationships within the Youth 
Commission.
      
B.D. (19), a semah instructor and an active member of the Commission, describes his first 
contact with the Youth:
When I came here first,  I was 9 years old. After that time, I devoted myself to this 
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shrine. I have been here in every sunday since then. There were big brothers here who 
were university graduates, well-educated, and highly aware of everything from whom I 
learned a lot. I was very little but I was attending their activities and watching them. 
They were giving responsibilities to me in the activities. For instance, although I was 
very little, they made me the group leader in semah and I became extremely happy. For 
instance, Brother ...  (senior semah instructor) smoothed the way for me. He believed in 
me. He appreciated my efforts. One of the best things about here is that senior fellows 
encourage the participation of the juniors. In that way, they both relieve their burden and 
hinder the disappearance of the tradition8.  
B.B. (17) is a two years member of the Commission. He explains how his personal relationships 
with the people in the Commission have turned to be strong ties of friendships.
Most of my friends in my life are from the Dergah. The ties of friendship here are so 
deep. Our way of looking at the faith, politics, and the world is similar. We have strong 
feelings of empathy and tolerance towards each other. I do not think I can find these 
kinds of relationships anywhere. This is different. We are comrades.9
H.L. (33), a senior semah instructor, stated that: 
We have got accustomed to here a lot.  Most of our friends are here. Probably,  we 
would not make it outside. We have grown up here. Everything is here. I have very 
few friends outside10. 
The views expressed above demonstrate that the youth's space in the Dergah functions as a 
"breeding ground" for the production of social capital (see Putnam, 2000). Robert Putnam (2000), 
describes the concept of social capital as "connections among individuals—social networks and the 
8 Translated into English from original: "9 yaşındaydım geldiğimde ve o günden sonra hayatımı 
vakfettim nerdeyse buraya. Yani pazar günleri hep burada oldum nadir farklılıklar olmadığı sürece. 
Ondan sonra geldim, ...  abi o dönemde burdaydı, ... abi zaten burda. İşte ... abiler filan ve çok güzel 
gençlik  çalışmaları  oluyordu.  Yani  bir  de  hepsi  okumuş  yazmış  ve  bilinçli  insanlardı.Şu  an 
aramızdaki insanlar okuma babında demiyorum ama bilinç biraz daha eksik eskiye göre. Onun için 
değerlendirirken eski gençliği daha hoşnutlukla karşılıyorum ve beni hoşnut etmekte daha mutlu 
ediyor.  Yani onların yaptığı çalışmalar küçüktüm müçüktüm ama aralarında geziyordum, yaptığı 
çalışmalarda  bana  görev  veriyorlardı,  beni  mutlu  ediyordu.  Misal  semahta  beni  ekip  başı 
yapmışlardı ve ben çok mutlu olmuştum. Bu genç yaşımda örneğin ...  abiler benim önümü açtı  
ciddi  anlamda  ve  özellikle  bu  işin  ilk  şeyini  yapan  ilk  adımı  atan  ...  abi  gerçekten  benim 
hakkettiğime  inandı,  benim hoca  olmamı  sağladı.  Haa  hocalık  çok  önemli  mi  değil  ama  bana 
verdiği değer çok önemli ve şunu da görüyoruz burda çalışmalar içinde insanlar çalışmalara hep 
birbirlerini  dahil  ediyor  ve  kendi  üstündeki  yükü  hem paylaşıyor  hem de  yolun  kaybolmasını 
engelliyor."
9 Translated into English from original: "Arkadaşlarım şu anda en çok Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı'ndan 
ve gittikçe artıyor ve artmasını da istiyorum. Burdaki dostluk normal arkadaşlık sayılabilecek bir 
dostluk  değil.  Çok  çok  ilerisinde  ve  derin  çünkü  düşüncelerimiz,  yapımız,  inancımız,  siyasete 
bakışımız,  herşeye bakışımız nerdeyse birbiriyle  aynı.  Gençlik komisyonundaki  herkes birbirine 
daha çok şefkatli, daha çok ilgiliyiz. Böyle bir  arkadaşlığın bulunmayacağını düşünüyorum. Bu 
yoldaşlıktır aslında."
10 Translated into English from original: "Şimdi şey yani biz alıştık artık. Çevremiz burda, arkadaş 
çevremiz burda. Yani belki biz burasız yapamazdık çünkü burda yetiştik. Yani herşey burda. Benim 
dışarda doğru dürüst bi arkadaş çevrem yok. "
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norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness  that arise from them”(p.19). Putnam (2000)  argues that 
networks and voluntary associations are breeding ground for the production of social capital. For 
Putnam (1993),  social  capital  is  central  to  any civic  engagement  because  it  "can  improve  the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (p.167). 
Many examples  of  collective action from the youth's  history epitomize the idea of  how 
social  capital-embedded  in  networks  of  relationships  helps  people  to  coordinate  their  actions. 
Several examples from the present case study can be named to illustrate this point: the formation of 
Alevi Bektashi Youth Platform in alliance with the  Alevi youth of other institutions; organization of 
the yearly thematic conference series, Traditional Youth Days, (sometimes thematizing the issues of 
private concerns regarding  Alevilik and sometimes the issues of common concern such as Global 
Warming or the Education Reform); contribution to the  Dergahta Birlik Projesi  (Unity in Shrine 
Project) initiated by the prominent religious figures of Alevi community; organization of music and 
dance performances for contributing to the education of the poor, and organizing and attending 
demonstrations, and so on. 
However,  social  capital  does not  always  and necessarily yield positive results  for social 
cooperation  and  peaceful  coexistence  of  differences.  For  that  reason,  scholars  often  make  a 
distinction between different forms of social capital. Two forms of social capital are widespread in 
the literature. These are bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital describes "co-
operative and trusting relations between members of a  network who see themselves as similar in 
terms of their shared social identity". Bridging social capital, on the other hand, describes a situation 
of  "respect  and  mutuality  between  people  who  know  that  they  are  not  alike  in  some  socio-
demographic sense  (differing  by  age,  ethnic  group,  class  etc.)"  (Rostila,  2010,  pp.312-313). 
Scholars contend that bridging social relationships are more supportive of social cooperation and 
peaceful coexistence as they allow people to develop feelings of trust and reciprocity to the wider 
publics  and interact  and cooperate  with the wider  networks  going beyond their  ethnic/religious 
enclaves (Rostila, 2010). 
      
In this light it is possible to argue that the composition of the Youth Commission is more 
conducive  to  the  formation  of  bonding  social  capital.  This  is  because  most  of  their  social 
relationships occur with the members of the Alevi community. Although bonding social capital is 
supportive of the feelings of solidarity, trust, and cooperation among the group members, an excess 
ive "we" feeling might lead to the alienation of the young from the outside world. On the other  
hand, the composition of the Youth Commission in terms of diversity with regard to ethnic identity 
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and  political  affiliation  might  become  significant  in  precluding  the  formation  of  an  excessive 
collective  identity  and  allow  the  participants  to  have  an  access  to  the  wider  networks.  The 
participants'  ethnic  identity  and  political  affiliations  exhibit  remarkable  diversity.  In  terms  of 
ethnicity,  the Commission consists  of  Turks,  Kurds,  and Zazas.  The informants  also report  the 
presence of a few Sunni people in the past. One of the informants stated that he has relatives with an 
Armenian background as well. In terms of political orientations, the Commission embraces different 
colors of the Turkish left.  Although most of the participants are official  members of the Youth 
Branch of the Republican People's Party, there are participants who are sympathetic to Freedom and 
Solidarity Party (ÖDP), Turkey's Communist Party (TKP), and Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). 
5.6. The Youth Commission: A Discursive Space 
In keeping with Cohen and Arato's definition of civil society, a close examination of the 
Şahkulu Youth Commission yields that it seems to be not only a network of rich social capital but 
also  an  informal  association  organized  along deliberative  procedures.  Strong ties  of  friendship, 
trustworthiness, and reciprocity prepare the ground for an organized form of communication among 
the youth. 
The procedures defining the workings of a deliberative process can be summed up under 
four criteria: 
• inclusion, being open and accessible to a wider population; 
• rationality, deliberation being a collective decision making process ruled by the force of the 
better argument; 
• publicity, arguments have to be justified in front of all the participants; 
• and  consensus,  the  regulatory  ideal  of  the  discussion  should  be  the  largest  possible 
agreement amongst participants (Talpin, 2007, p.207).
In  terms  of  the  subject  at  hand  ,  Seyla  Benhabib  (1992)  states  that  the  norm  of 
communication which governs the workings of a discursive public space is the idea of egalitarian 
reciprocity. She explains it as follows: 
The procedural constraints of the ideal speech situation are that each participant must 
have an equal chance to initiate and to continue communication; each must have an 
equal chance to make assertions, recommendations, and explanations; all must have 
equal  chances  to  express  their  wishes,  desires,  and  feelings;  and  finally,  within 
dialogue, speakers must be free to thematize those power relations that in ordinary 
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contexts  would  constrain  the  wholly  free  articulation  of  opinions  and  positions. 
Together these conditions specify a norm of communication that can be named that of 
egalitarian reciprocity (p.89). 
This leads me to invstigate to what extent the youth's norms of communication accommodate the 
requirements of egalitarian reciprocity. To this end, the ways in which they organize the discursive 
space  and  the  relationship  between  the  organizational  structure  and  communication  patterns 
deserves particular attention. 
Participation in the discussions of the Commission is open to everybody eager to partake. The 
Commission has not specific entry requirements. For instance, there is no age requirement even 
though the name of the Commission refers to the youth. The ages of the participants vary from the 
fifteen to the fifty. Considering the fact that some of the members are married and have children, 
marriage  is  not  considered  as  a  threshold  drawing  a  line  between  adolescence  and  adulthood. 
Moreover, being a member of the Alevi identity is not asked, either. The respondents stated that 
there were also some Sunni people  in the past. There is no need for signature for formalizing 
membership and no membership fee as well.  The basis for participation is not membership but 
volunteering.  However,  it  does  not  mean that  the way in which individuals  participate  is  non-
organized. As Calhoun stresses, the ideal of publicness requires active communication, not the lazy 
citizens (Calhoun, 2011, p.319). In keeping with this, in one of the meetings B.U. (35) pointed to 
the importance of disciplining the participation and many others agreed with him. He said:
Volunteering  is  devoting  yourself  to  working  for  our  cause.  It  does  not  mean 
indiscipline. Comrades should relieve the burdens of their fellows. We need qualified 
people here. Quantity does not matter. Sanctions are must for disciplining ourselves. 
We should punish those who are unwilling to abide with the rules.  Otherwise,  we 
cannot achieve our goals11. 
With regard to the membership styles of associations, Akman refers to the presence of two 
extremes (2012, p.331). On the one hand, there are associations with minimal entry and exit costs,  
demanding minimal commitments from members,  and emotionally less demanding participation 
(Akman, 2012). On the other hand, there are associations which involve strict entry and exit costs, 
maximalist demands on members, and having a transformative force on the identities and life styles  
of the members (Akman, 2012). Considering these two extremes, the Youth Commission certainly 
diverges  from the loosely defined membership  style.  It  has  not  a  perfect  match with  the other 
11 Translated into English from original: "Gönüllülük hizmete adanmaktır. Bu disiplinsizlik anlamına 
gelmez.  Kararlara  uymayanlar  gelmesinler.  Disiplin  önemli.  Yoldaşlık  yükleri  azaltmaktır.  Biz 
burada  nitelikli  insanlara  ihtiyaç  duyuyoruz.  Nicelik  önemli  değil.  Kurallara  uymayanlara  ceza 
verilmeli. Disiplin için yaptırım şart. Aksi takdirde hedeflerimize ulaşmamız çok zor. " 
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extreme,  either.  As the  participants  of  the  Commission  organize  around an  identity of  faith,  it  
transforms  the  identities  and  life  styles  of  the  participants.  As  D.Z.  (30)  pointed  out,  the 
Commission has a moral perception of its own shaping the behaviors of the participants. Yet, on the 
basis of my observation, I can argue that it has not a stifling quality. Here, the critical distinction is 
that the Alevi faith system has been historically associated with a non-stifling or non-repressive 
ethos and practices owing to its heterodox nature. For that reason, even if the ethos of Commission 
has an influence on the lives of people, it is not stifling. 
To  continue  with  the  procedures  of  the  deliberative  processes,  flexible  organizational 
structure  of  the  Commission  encourages  the  individuals  to  involve  in  an  open  and  free 
communication style. Regarding the principles of organizational structure, the participants have a 
similar orientation with the members of new social movements like feminist movements, ecological 
movements, peace movement, and some others (Pichardo, 1997, p.416). They support forms of non-
hierarchical and non-bureaucratic organizational structures. In opposition the widespread tendency 
among the  Youth  Commissions  in  Alevi  community,  they reject  organizing  around a leader  or 
governing body. Rather, they have prefer having a rotational spokesperson. Recalling the principle 
of egalitarian reciprocity, this form of organizational structure is quite important because it allows 
people to have an equal chance to deliberate as equal peers thereby eliminating structuring quality 
of hierarchy and difference. 
     
B.D.  (19)  explains  that  this  egalitarian  organizational  structure  has  its  roots  in  the  Alevi 
theology:
We do not have a leader. We do not believe in the power of one man (tek adamlık). Our 
theology allows us to question everything. It comes from the workings of cem ritual. As 
dede asks  the  participants  for  their  consent  before  starting  the  ritual,  we  similarly 
deliberate things among us and decide collectively. As happens in the kırklar cemi, we 
are all same. We are all equal. We all have equal voice. The forties of us amount to one 
of use. One of us amounts to forties of us12. 
The Commission also seems to be successful in socializing the new members into the prevailing 
norms and values  respected  among them.  B.B.  (17),  one  of  the  newest  members,  explains  his 
viewsregarding the leadership:
I am against the leadership. Because if we are all bonded at the heart and if we all work 
12 Translated into English from original: "Yok, bizde başkanlık sistemi yok çünkü tek adamlık yok 
bizde. Yani kişilerin her zaman sorgulama sistemi var. Bunun da geldiği yer Alevi ibadeti ve cem. 
Cemde nasıl dede posta oturmadan önce razı mısınız diye kendini sorgulatabiliyorsa biz de insanları 
kendi  içimizde  sorgulayıp  hep  birlikte  karar  alıyoruz.  Onun  için  kırklar  cemindeki  gibi  aynı 
hepimiz,  aynıyız,  bir  ayrım gütmüyoruz ve birlikteliği  sağlamış oluyoruz.  "Kırkımız da birimiz, 
birimiz de kırkımız" mantığına geliyor."
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for this collectivity, we should all have equal voice13.
In its history, which goes back almost two decades, the Youth Commission has developed its 
own well-established rules, norms, and values in the workings of the weekly deliberation sessions. 
These normative and procedural principles are highly valued because they are an accumulation of 
the tested-experiences of different generations. 
Accordingly,  meetings are held twice a week, on Wednesdays and Sundays. The duration of 
the meetings varies from one to three hours contingent upon the number of  topics on the agenda. 
They are quite strict on the timings of the meetings. Anyone who is late more than fifteen minutes is 
not accepted to attend the meetings. There is no exception to this rule. Once, I personally observed 
that the most vocal senior participant of the Commission avoided entering the meeting room since 
he was quite late. Since there is no leader, anyone willing is entitled to be a moderator. Yet, the 
tendency is to give this role to one of the junior participants in order to socialize them into the 
workings of the deliberative process. 
When the meeting starts,  everybody is  expected to actively participate to  the discussions, 
share their views, and be attentive to those who are speaking. The Commission has well-established 
and highly respected-norms regulating the style of communication among the individuals, whose 
observation is excepted from participants. The senior members have an active role in reminding the 
juniors these principles. People those interrupting the others' speeches, exceeding the time limit, 
raising  their  voices  aggressively,  amusing themselves  with  their  cell-phones,  leaving the  space 
without  excuse  are  warned.  Then,  the  moderator  initiates  the  discussion  and  asks  the  other 
participants for the issues which they want to be discussed. It does not exceed five or six topics.  
The agenda topics change every week in parallel with the agenda of the Dergah, Alevi community 
in general, the country's general public agenda, and sometimes the global agenda. It is  a matter of 
how they prioritize the issues. 
Boundaries  of  public  sphere  with  regard  to  which  topics  are  to  be  involved  in  public 
deliberation is a widely discussed issue. Habermas is quite clear on this matter: individuals in the 
public sphere deliberate about the common good (Habermas, 1974, p.49). However, this view has 
been heavily criticized by many scholars,  and particularly so by feminists. According to Fraser, the 
public  and  private  distinctions  serve  to  "delegitimate  some interests,  views,  and  topics  and  to 
13 Translated into English from original: "Hiyerarşik bir sisteme genel olarak karşıyım. Burası bir 
kurulsa, herkes buraya gönül veriyorsa, emek veriyorsa  hepsinin düşüncesi bir olmalı."
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valorize others...This usually works to the advantage of dominant groups and individuals and to the 
disadvantage of their subordinates" (1992, p.131). The history of the feminist struggle to politicize 
the issues of female body and sexuality is an illustrative case in point. That is to say, domestic 
violence was considered as a private concern for a long time but it turned to be a common concern  
owing to the the feminists' efforts to thematize it in their counterpublics and then, disseminate it to 
the  wider  public.  The  experiences  of  the  feminist  movement  proved  that  the  public-private 
distinctions  are  political  constructions  and subjected  to  change  (Benhabib,  1992;  Fraser,  1992; 
Ryan, 1992; Eley, 1992). Thus, issues of common concern are not predetermined facts but  the 
result of individuals deciding by themselves  through discursive interaction what is to be considered 
public or private.
     
The main function of the Youth's discursive space needs to be understood within the tension 
between the "generalizable interests" and "culturally interpreted needs" (Benhabib,  1992, p.88). 
Fraser (1992) explains the relationship between public sphere and identity as follows:
public spheres themselves are not spaces of zero-degree culture...public spheres are not 
only arenas for the formation of discursive opinion; in addition, they are arenas for the 
formation and enactment of social identities...participation means being able to speak in 
one's  own voice,  and thereby simultaneously to  construct  and express  one's  cultural 
identity through idiom and style (p.126).
In keeping with Fraser's thoughts, the main function of the young's discursive engagement is to 
formulate an oppositional interpretation of Alevi identity, and to circulate this vision to the wider 
Alevi population while simultaneously constructing itself as an embryonic counter public within the 
general Alevi counter public. 
The young movement's oppositional interpretation of identity has developed as a reaction to 
the efforts of circles who want to assert their conception of Alevi identity in a hegemonic manner. 
This vision belongs to the  Cem Vakfı  (Cem Foundation)14. Within the Alevi community, the  Cem 
Vakfı has  emerged  as  politically  and  economically  the  most  powerful  group  and  shows  an 
outstanding performance in reaching the wider Alevi population through particularly channels of 
visual and printed media. This distinguished power position  endows it with the ability to define the 
boundaries  of  the  Alevi  identity.  On this  relationship  between power and knowledge,  Foucault 
(1977) provides a pertinent account:
Knowledge linked to power, not only assumes the authority of 'the truth' but has the 
power to make itself true. All knowledge, once applied in the real world, has effects,  
and in that sense at least, 'becomes true.' Knowledge, once used to regulate the conduct 
of others, entails constraint, regulation and the disciplining of practice. Thus, 'there is no 
14 For further information, please check the website: http://www.cemvakfi.org.tr/ 
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power relation without  the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge,  nor any 
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power relations 
(p.27).
In keeping with this Foucaultian power/knowledge relationship, the tenets of the ground on 
which the  Cem Vakfı stands within the Alevi community can be  subsumed under three headings 
(Okan,  2004,  pp.126-149).  First  of  all,  the  strategy of  the  Cem Vakfı towards  the  plethora  of 
interpretations is the taming of the Alevi identity into one single interpretation via standardizing the 
practices and ethos of the identity. Secondly, this single interpretation is based on a construction 
assuming that "Alevi Islam" is  the real essence of Islam and its  ethos and practices have been 
historically shaped by the Turks in Anatolia. Finally, the ultimate objective of the Cem Vakfı is to 
integrate the "Alevi Islam" into the state through a restructuring of the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs (Okan, 2004). 
The Cem Vakfı's efforts to make its discourse hegemonic have evoked resistance among the 
participants of the Youth Commission. The young's interpretation of Alevi identity is grounded in 
the understanding of  Alevilik as a syncretic structure whose ethos were historically shaped by the 
contributions of various communities living in Anatolia and influenced from diverse faith systems 
from monotheistic religions to Zoroastrianism, shamanism, and Buddhism. For the youth, in face of 
current  realities,  Alevi  identity  is  more  of  "a  multicultural  garden"(çok  kültürlü  bahçe),-which 
involves  elements of faith, philosophical pursuit, and political posture. However, it does not mean 
that they reject other interpretations or bases of identification. In this regard, one discourse is very 
common among the young: "There is one path but many ways to follow". D.Z. (30) expresses: 
If somebody defines Alevilik in a different form, it is not a problem for me. It becomes 
a problem only if proponents of any vision start to assert it as the right and only form of 
the belief  and try to form a domination over other views...The motives for personal 
transformation should come from inside. Change occurs with love. 15
This particular understanding of  identity allows the young to problematize the issues which 
might  be loosely related with the  theology of  the belief  in  the  case of  other  interpretations.  A 
implication of this situation for civil society is that discursive engagement which revolves around 
the culturally specific needs begins to concern with the issues of common interest. For instance, in 
one of the Youth Days, which is organized in every summer around a common theme, the young 
15 Translated into English from original: "Bir insan kendini böyle tanımladığında ve başkasına bunu 
dayatmadığı süre içerisinde ve kendisini bir kimliğin sözcüsü olarak ifade etmediği sürece benim 
için problem değil. Yani sözcü derken bir grubun tahakkümü, misyoneri gibi davranmadığı sürece 
benim için  problem yok,  karışmıyorum yani.  İlgilendirmiyor  daha  doğrusu  beni  karışmıyorum 
derken. Değişim içerden gelmeli. Değişim ancak aşk ile mümkün olabilir. "
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thematized the issue of global warming, and brought it into the agenda of people in the  Dergah. 
D.Z. (30) explains the rationale behind thematizing global warming in their discursive spaces:
We organized this event as a result of our belief. Alevilik does not reside in somewhere 
outside  the  world.  It  exists  under  these  circumstances.  We  live  under  these 
circumstances. This event is an extension of Alevilik as culture in our daily lives. Living 
in peace with the nature is a necessity of Alevilik. The culture requires us to be sensitive 
to the right to life, the rights of others, not necessarily our lives. And, it urges us to 
mobilize and take action as far as an injustice is concerned. As one of the Alevi saints 
said before, 'if you remain silent before injustices, you lose your honor as well as your 
rights'16. 
Thus, the presence of these sorts of events suggest that the young's oppositional interpretation of 
identity provides them with culturally specific lenses which encourage them to go beyond the scope 
of their enclaves and develop concerns with and also for others. 
5.7. Power Relations, Exclusions, and the Youth's Counter Public 
Formulating a clearly defined identity encourages the young to perform a critical function of 
civil society associations. As Cohen and Arato (1992) assert, "The political role of civil society is 
not directly related to the control or conquest of power but the generation of influence through the 
life of democratic associations and unconstrained discussion in the cultural public sphere"(pp.ix-x). 
In this regard, the participants of the Commission have striven to generate an influence on mainly 
two problems: the efforts towards the assimilation of Alevilik by the hands of the Alevis themselves 
and non-democratic organizational practices within the institutions. 
16 Translated into English from original: "Hani Alevilik diyince şöyle bir şey  yok, yani dünyanın 
dışında işte hani belki kimi zaman tanım yapınca böyle bir şey söz konusu olabiliyor çünkü tanım 
başka bir uzaya atmak gibi bir şey Aleviliği ya da herhangi bir şey gibi  tıpkı. Alevilik uzayda bir  
yerde değil ya da işte çok uzakta bir yerde değil, bu dünyada bu  koşullar içerisinde yaşıyor ve bu  
koşullar içerisinde hani bir kopmuşluk yok yani bu koşullar içerisinde Alevilik inancından kaynaklı 
olarak, Alevilik inancının sonucu olarak bu tür eylemlere girişiyor bence. Yani biz mesela hani o 
dönemde bunları yaparken de bir Alevilik inancının sonucu olarak bunları yapıyorduk. Yani hani 
dünya kendi dışında algıladığın bir şey değil, dünyanın içersindesin, yaşamın içerisindesin. Mesela 
hani ben şeyde demiştim ya kültürle ilgili bir sorun vardı senin yani kültürün senin pratiğin etkisi 
nedir diye ona verdiğim bir yanıt vardı benim işte hani sonuçta hani bir telkinde bulunuyor insanlara 
sürekli olarak. Ne yap? İyi ol, doğru ol, güzel ol. Şimdi sen diyelim ki iyi olmak, doğru olmak için 
çabalıyorsun. Bunlar Alevilik düşüncesinin, disiplininin ürettiği sonuçlar. Bu sonuçlardan bir tanesi 
de mesela doğaya karşı saygılı ol ya da yaşama karşı, başkasının hakkına karşı duyarlı ol. İllaki 
senin hakkının yenmesi olarak da  görme bunu. Yani başkasının hakkının yendiği noktada da y ada 
senin  hakkının  yendiği  noktada  da buna karşı  duyarlı  ol  ve  harekete  geç,  eylem yap,  eylemde 
bulun.İşte hani şöyle bir söz vardı "haksızlık karşısında eğilmeyiniz, hakkınızla birlikte şerefinizi de 
kaybedersiniz". 
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The problematization of these issues within the Dergah has resulted in an exclusion of the 
youth  by  the  authorities  holding  power.  The  exclusion  of  the  youth  is  a  critical  point  in  the 
emergence of the youth's  space as a counter public.  Fraser (1992) argues that  "Counter publics 
emerge in response to exclusions within dominant publics and they help expand discursive space" 
(p.124).  Within the boundaries  of  the Shrine,  the youth has  been subjected to  a  mechanism of 
double exclusion. While its criticism of the Shi'ization of the identity has directly positioned them 
against the authority of the traditional figure (dede),  their critique of the unjust power relations 
within  decision-making  body  paved  the  way  for  a  profound  contestation  of  the  authority  of 
members of the governing body. In the following paragraphs, I will delve into this contestation’s 
specific dynamics. 
The clash between the dede and the young is a micro-space manifestation of  power relations 
among  Alevi actors,-who can be seen to be in rivalry about defining the boundaries of their group 
identity. From the youth’s perspective, the  dede's thoughts and practices are representative of the 
Cem Vakfı's poisition. Similarly, the Alevi authors are proponents of this view, who give weekly 
lessons on Alevilik in Dergah.  The posture of the youth on this position is clear: it has self-defeating 
implications for the Anadolu Aleviliği. This vision amounts to the assimilation of the Alevilik in the 
form of Shi'ization. 
Fraser (1992) argues that "in stratified societies the discursive relations among differentially 
empowered publics are as likely to take the form of contestation as that of deliberation" (p.125). In 
the case of the dede and the youth, the discursive relations took the form of harsh contestations. The 
channels  of  deliberation  were  completely  closed  down  when  the  dede became  a  part  of  the 
governing body. After that point, the dede benefited from his authority position in order to block the 
workings of the youth in the  Dergah. When the conflict reached extreme dimensions, the young 
people were physically dismissed from the cem space, their semah practices were blocked, and they 
were  denied  to  have  a  space  to  do  their  weekly  meetings.  Under  these  circumstances,  the 
participants of the Commission have never ceased to engage in discursive interaction. B.D. (19) 
explains how they continued to gather in open air spaces under snow and rain. Despite all these 
ostacles, the very fact that they continued and enlarged their activities stands as a sign that their 
movement even gained momentum in face of the conflict.
Fraser (1992) asserts that "...to interact discursively as a member of public,  subaltern or 
otherwise, is to aspire to disseminate one's discourse to ever widening arenas" (p.124). In keeping 
with this, the youth undertook several activities in order to circulate their counter discourses to the  
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wider Alevi public. To this end, they thematized the issue of self-assimilation under the title of  
"Anatolian Alevilik in the Grip of Assimilation" during the Youth Days in 2009. By starting with the 
Youth Days and later in the larger gatherings and meetings of the Alevi community, the  youth  
disseminated their counter discourses from the wider Alevi public through their manifest, entitled 
"We are against". 
While conflicting with the traditional authority, the Şahkulu youth simultaneously engaged in 
a  contestation  with  the  ruling  authority  in  the  Dergah.  In  understanding  the  source  of  this 
contestation, Habermas's  arguments are quite useful.  Habermas argues that such publics aim to 
"mediate between society and the state by holding the state accountable to society via publicity" (as 
cited  in  Fraser,  p.112). In  the  micro-space  of  the  Dergah,  accountability  can  be  problematized 
within the context of the power relations between the governing body and the participants of the 
Dergah. In this respect, the interviews I conducted lay bare that the central concern of the youth was 
to democratize the Wakf's non-democratic charter. B.D. (19) described the practices of the ruling 
body,  with the metaphor of  "a sultanate system". D.Z. (30) states:
We wanted to democratize the Wakf charter. We were ready to do anything necessary. 
Reaching influential people to create a strong pressure, petition campaigns, sit-in acts, 
and anything necessary to raise people's awareness and pressuring the ruling body...We 
were bound and determined to democratize this anti-democratic charter17.
The  youth  criticized  the  charter  because  it  did  not  allow  to  a  transparent,  accountable,  and 
participatory decision making process. Rather, this rule rested on an arbitrary and unlimited usage 
of power.  
The  administration  of  the  Dergah consists  of  three  bodies:  the  founders'  committee  (7 
people), board of trustee (35 people), and the governing body. Power is hierarchically dispersed 
along these  bodies.  The previous  charter  vested  the  members  of  the  founders'  committee  with 
unlimited powers.  Most importantly, their membership status is granted them for life. Moreover, in 
the case of death, their rights may pass on to those people who are entitled by the members of the  
committee. Furthermore,  they have an absolute tenure on the property of the Wakf.  The Shrine 
might be closed down by their request. Also, they had a right to dissolve the governing body which 
is formed through democratic elections.
          
17 Translated into English from original: "Kongreden hemen sonra ve öncesinde konuştuğumuz şey 
buydu. Yani biz vakıf tüzüğünün daha demokratik olması için elimizden geleni yapacağız.  Yani 
üzerimize düşen ne varsa işte. Birileri ile konuşmaksa, kamuoyu baskısı yaratmaksa...Yani gerekirse 
burada imza kampanyası, oturma şeklinde, insanları bilinçlendirme şeklinde ne varsa yani burada 
olan şeyin anti-demokratik yapının bir şekilde sonlanmasını talep ediyorduk."
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The democratization of the Wakf charter was an extremely challenging task in light of the 
position of the youth. That's to say, the Youth Commission has no official status to make a pressure 
on change. Also, the demographics of the young demonstrate that they are disadvantageous in terms 
of their class status. Most of them are not wage-earners. Under these circumstances, they had only 
few communication channels to bring about a change. The only strategy that may have produced 
positive result could have been influencing  the prevalent  public opinion within the  Dergah. The 
young in fact achieved this. The first step was raising an awareness in people about this issue. Then, 
they succeeded in discussing the status of charter in a congress which was held open to the public. 
As a  result  of  a  process  of  bitter  discussions,  the youth  accomplished democratizing  the Wakf 
charter  to  an  important  degree.  Particularly,  the  power  asymmetries  among  the  organs  were 
diminished via allocating the before-mentioned rights  among the 35 people rather than 7 people. 
With the democratization of the charter, the process of creating influence on authorities has 
not come to an end. Democratization requires a rotation of power which is essential to hear the 
voices of alternative forces within the Dergah. Yet, the youth stated that the same people occupied 
the positions of power in the  Dergah very long time. With regard to this, the young mobilized to 
create an influence on the composition of the decision making body. At the final stage, the young's 
efforts of lobbying became successful in bringing their candidate into the power. The new president 
differs from the previous authorities in his interpretation of Alevi identity and approximates to the 
youth's interpretation. He also dramatically drifts apart the strong Kemalist/Republican posture of 
the people in the  Dergah's administration and the public in general. The new president, who is a 
Zaza-speaking Alevi and a victim of the 1980 coup d'etat,  strives to initiate a democratic opening in 
the Dergah nowadays. 
Nevertheless,  the  accomplishment  of  this  objective  was  never  painless.  It  came  at  the 
expense of the exclusion of the youth. Despite this exclusion, the Youth Commission has never 
ceased to perform as a platform for deliberation and action. As Fraser (1992) argues:
in stratified societies, subaltern counter publics have a dual character. On the one hand, 
they function as spaces of withdrawal and regroupment; on the other hand, they also 
function as bases and training grounds for agitational activities directed toward wider 
publics.  It  is  precisely  in  the  dialectic  between  these  two  functions  that  their 
emancipatory potential resides. This dialectic enables subaltern counter publics partially 
to offset, although not wholly to eradicate, the unjust participatory privileges enjoyed by 
members of dominant social groups in stratified societies (p.124).
Likewise, the Youth Commission has provided the young people with a "space of withdrawal and 
regroupment"  and  a  "base  and  training  ground  for  agitational  activities  directed  toward"  the 
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authority figures within the Dergah. The resultant product of this activism has been to exterminate 
the unjust power relations within the Dergah to an important degree. 
5.8. Future Prospects for the Şahkulu Youth?
So far I have shown that the Şahkulu Youth has begun to construct a micro counter public 
which has contested the hegemonic discourses of the Alevi identity and the exclusionary norms 
underlying  the  style  of  decision  making  within  the  Şahkulu  Sultan  Dergahı.  Yet,  within  the 
framework of the general Alevi public, the status of the  Şahkulu Youth resembles an embryonic 
form of counter public. Given that a new president in the Dergah  took office,- who happens to have 
the same orientation as the young, the youth might channel its energy into the projects going beyond 
the boundaries of the Dergah and begin to influence the wider Alevi public. Yet, here is a caveat  
involved.  If the  Şahkulu youth strives to become an autonomous subject within the general Alevi 
public  with  a  power  to  shape  an  oppositional  interpretation  of  Alevi  identity  and  contest  the 
structured  power  relations  characterizing  the  Alevi  institutions,  it  needs  to  overcome one  very 
crucial weakness, the quality of its public discourse.
Thus far, the  Şahkulu youth showed a considerable degree of success in challenging the 
immediate  power  relations  surrounding  them within  the  Dergah.  However,  their   raison d'etre 
transcends such immediate concerns. That is to say, they formulate their mission as the resurrection 
of the authentic form  of the Alevi identity.  This is  a demanding task,  though. Formulating an 
oppositional  interpretation of the identity discourses against those discourses  striving to become 
hegemonic requires a profound and sophisticated engagement in and with the public discourse. 
        
 However, the youth's  general engagement in the discursive space is characterized by a lack 
of  sophistication  in  discussions  and  a  lack  of  enthusiasm  to  deliberate  and  interact  with  the 
participants.  The  narratives  of  the  informants  demonstrate  that  competent  university  students 
constituted the main driving force in the heyday of the Commission. Hence, public discourse has 
increasingly deteriorated as the efficacy of the university students has diminished. This situation has 
grave  implications  for  the  internal  workings  of  the  Youth  Commission.  Most  importantly,  this 
situation encourages the creation of an internal power relations between participants who are seniors 
and  the  more  experienced,  the  more  educated,  the  more  communication-wise,  and  the  more 
confident in ability of the self-expression and those who have the less of everything. Although it is  
an unintended consequence, the stances of a small minority dominates the others. A more serious 
challenge to the Commission comes from the fact that the small minority has begun to show signs 
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of  fatigue  from performing  too  much  responsibility.  This  might  lead  to  the  dissolution  of  the 
Commission if it is left to continue. 
Beyond the internal workings of the Commission, the poor quality of public discourse might 
become an obstacle before the ultimate mission of the Commission, the resurrection of the Anadolu 
Aleviliği.  Owing  to  the  Commission's  failure to  encourage  an  environment  of  intellectual 
deliberation to flourish and a sophisticated communicative action might confine their activism to the 
level of a reactive movement which does not have so much chance to ignite the wick of a change 
within the wider Alevi community. Thus, if the Şahkulu Youth is to become a respectable counter 
public  in  the wider Alevi  community,  certain improvements on the sophistication of the public 
communication seem to be an essential component of this process. 
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CHAPTER 6
DEMOCRATIZING THE YOUTH'S COUNTER PUBLIC:
CIVILITY and SELF-LIMITATION
6.1. Introduction
In  contemporary debates,  the  students  of  civil  society are  preoccupied  with  a  particular 
conception  that  stresses  a  particular  dimension  of  civil  society  referring  to  "a  given  stock  of 
organizational capacities that exist autonomously from the state" (Akman, 2012, p.329). However, 
some scholars contend that this conception is far away from reflecting an accurate picture of civil  
society because it  falls  short  of distinguishing civil  society from uncivil  society  (Bieber,  2003; 
Casquete, 2005; Chambers and Kopstein, 2001; Dryzek, 1996; Fiorina, 1999; Foley and Edwards, 
1996; Kopecky, 2003; Mudde, 2003; Whitehead, 2004; as cited in Akman, 2012). In keeping with 
this, Swift maintains that "if civil society is a catch-all category encompassing an  assortment of 
groupings and a diversity of social  forces and interactions, then unquestionably it also includes 
fascists, terrorists, racketeers, criminal elements as well as individuals and groups committed to 
democracy and the much fancied neighborhood organizations" (as cited in Johnson, 2006, p.45)
The  ontological  conception  of  civil  society  fails  to  differentiate  between  the  groups 
committed to civil society and those inimical to it by conflating the two. Hence, the ambivalence on  
the usage of the term requires the students of civil society to find out what exactly constitutes the 
civil society apart from being an ontological entity.  With respect to this,  Norton argues that "civil 
society is  more  than  letterhead  stationery,  membership  lists,  public  charters  and  manifestos...It 
refers  to  a  quality...without  which  the  milieu  consists  of  feuding factions,  cliques,  and cabals" 
(1993, p.214). This quality is the principle of civility, which constitutes the normative dimension of 
civil society. 
In grasping the meaning of civility, an understanding of its antithesis, incivility, might be 
illuminating. According to Casquete (2006), uncivil society comprises of "communities  suffering 
from an excess of collective identity...which  often leads to a pathological collective state in the 
form of social isolation, sectarianism, ethnocentrism, or self-closure within a narcissism of minor 
differences" (p.283).  Although these sorts  of communities are  conducive to the development  of 
strong  bonds  of  fraternity  among  the  members,  they  are  not  susceptible  to  the  blossoming  of 
respectful behavior towards the liberty of their members and outsiders and of a moral consideration 
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of equality of every human being, regardless of faith, ethnic origin, values or ideology (Casquete, 
2006, pp.284-286). Hence, uncivil communities often block the channels of communication among 
social actors through promotion of a "poisoning public speech and interaction with prejudice, hate, 
intolerance, and violence" (Akman, 2012, p.334). Thus, uncivil communities destroy the spirit of 
civil society. For that reason, any investigation of civil society should be able to single out civil 
actors from uncivil communities. 
       Going back to the definition of civility, as Norton (1993) points out, it is "a cast of mind, a 
willingness to live and let live" in simple terms (p.214). Complying with this principle requires 
social actors to recognize the presence of the others as moral agents deserving civility (Chambers 
and  Kopstein,  2001,  p.839).  It  urges  social  actors  to  accept  that  "there  is  no  right  answer" 
(Norton,1993, p.214) and "not all means to achieve the desired ends are legitimate" (Akman, 2012, 
p.334). Hence, social actors are expected to develop "habits of the heart" (tolerance, moderation, a 
willingness  to compromise, respect for opposing viewpoints and the rule of law), if they are to 
contribute to the social cooperation, peaceful existence, and flourishing of a democratic community 
(Johnson, 2006, p.346).  Akman (2012) formulates the concept of civility as  the "social  actors'  
willingness for non-repressive engagement with others in political and cultural contestation" (p.14). 
Supplementing this abstract orientation with a practical dimension, the principle of self-limitation 
describes  the ways in  which social  actors  "impose and enforce limits  on permissible  means to 
achieve the desired ends" (p.14). Grounded on this conceptualization, this study is endeavored to 
scrutinize  the  actors'  mode  of  interaction  with  differences  within  the  balance  between  abstract 
principles and daily life practices. 
This leaves us to the point that an empirical study whose theoretical framework anchored in 
forms  of  public  communication  shall  be  always  imperfect  without  investigating  normative 
orientations of the social actors in question. To this purpose, this chapter is intended to analyze the 
Alevi  youth's  mode  of  interaction  with  differences  on  the  level  of  engagement  with  the  state 
authority, out-group people and in-group members. I attempted to compare their attitudes toward 
differences with the stances of the Alevi adult with regard to the same issues in order to question 
whether their oppositional interpretation of identity and their experiences-anchored in the discursive 
space have an impact on their mode of interaction with differences in state, society, and the group 
itself. 
Before  starting  to  analyze  the  interview  narratives,  there  is  a  need  to  clarify  several 
methodological  concerns.  First  of  all,  the  conceptualization  of  differences  in  this  study is  not 
51
designed as an imposition by the author of this research. Rather, they are conceptualized around the 
widely-circulated public discourses, which I observed during the fieldwork in the Dergah. That's to 
say,  the  presumed  differences  reflect  the  people's  differences,  not  the  researcher's  preferences. 
Secondly, as this study is endeavored to understand the right balance between norms and practices, 
this concern is considered while preparing the interview questions. Rather than questioning their 
stances  on abstract  principles,  I  inquired the  ways  in  which they perceive the  differences  over 
particular events. To this purpose, the topics which constitute the subject matter of the questions are 
chosen from the recent-widely discussed issues from Turkish society and politics.
6.2. Engaging with the State Authority
Among the students of civil society, the most common way of seeing the civil society is 
viewing it as "an initiative and organization independent of and opposed to the state"(Chatterjee, 
1990;  as  cited  in  Akman,  2012,  p.323).  This  view often  characterizes  a  zero-sum relationship 
between state and civil society in that one side gains at the expense of the other side. However, 
Akman (2012) maintains that this understanding of civil society is "over-simplistic theoretically and 
inaccurate empirically" (pp.5-6). He argues that both empirical reality and philosophical accounts 
demonstrate  that  state  authority  is  necessary for  the  existence  of  civil  society to  an  important 
degree. That's to say, it prepares an environment which is conducive to the creation of civil, non-
violent, non-repressive engagements among social actors. It does so through "instituting the rule of 
law and  providing  the  minimum of  state  services  and  protections",  benefiting  mostly  from its 
unique power to monopolize the use of legitimate violence (Akman, 2012, pp.6-7). Therefore, civil 
society becomes possible under the conditions where "the legitimacy of the state is not constantly 
under threat through the aggressive anti-state actions of the citizens" (Johnston, 2006, p.49). 
Building on this, a healthy working of state-society relationships requires  the social actors 
to comply with "the rules of the game" (Schwedler, 1995, p. 7). That's to say, they are expected to 
employ legitimate instruments of monitoring and controlling the state authority (Schwedler, p.6). 
With regard to this, Keane argues that "the presence of widespread violence without doubt pushes a 
society closer to the uncivil end of the spectrum (as cited in Johnson, 2006, p.49). When this is the 
case, the power of the weapons supersedes the power of the better argument, leaving no space for 
the civil society to blossom. 
For any empirical scrutiny of civil society investigating the character of the social actors'  
relationship with the state authority, the concept of political culture emerges as a useful conceptual 
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instrument. Almond and Verba describes political culture "as a set of citizens’ orientations toward 
political objects based on their knowledge, beliefs, opinions and emotions" (as cited in Grigoriadis, 
2004, p.1). In other words, political  culture has a considerable influence on the ways in which 
people interact with the political authority and on how people perceive which actions or instruments 
are legitimate to countervail the political authority. Hence, the social and political ethos which are 
fostered by a democratic political culture might also nurture the matrix of values which is essential  
to the development of civil society.
Some studies demonstrate that the quality of political culture in Turkey is not very much 
supportive of a healthy working of democratic system (Esmer, 1999; Tesler and Altınoğlu, 2003). 
Developing a democratic political culture is important for flourishing of a civic culture  which is 
"based  on  communication  and  persuasion,  a  culture  of  consensus  and  diversity,  a  culture  that 
[permits] change but [moderates] it" (Almond and Verba, 1963, p.8). In keeping with this, some 
distinguished characteristics of the Turkish political culture is the dominance of state interests over 
fundamental  human  rights,  the  lesser  amounts  of  tolerance  for  cultural,  religious,  and  ethnic 
diversity,  and the poor levels  of trust  to  the democratic institutions and the exalted role  of the 
military and bureaucratic elite as guardian of the Western and secular character of the Turkish state 
and society (Grigoriadis, 2004; Kalaycıoğlu, 2008). 
Suffering  from  a  lack  of  "culture  of  communication  and  persuasion  and  a  culture  of 
consensus and diversity"  (Almond and Verba,  1963) among social  actors, the legitimacy of the 
means to influence politics has always been a serious concern in Turkey. In its recent history, some 
social and political actors have considered to employ extralegal means to challenge the political 
authority at various times. In the history of Turkish politics, the 1960 coup d'etat left a legacy of  
political involvement by the military in times of crisis. Currently, one of the widely-discussed topics 
in the Turkish politics is the Ergenekon case which involves the trials of those military officers who 
are  charged  with  attempting  to  organize  a  coup  d'etat  to  the  Justice  and  Development  Party 
government. Similarly, the armed struggle has been one of the long-established tradition of resorting 
to illegitimate means to claim an extralegal authority from the ideological confrontations of the 
1970s to the current  armed struggle of the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan. 
So far, I have endeavored to show that as a certain degree of state authority is supportive of 
the blossoming of civil society, social actors are bound up with acting within the scope of legitimate 
action.  Nevertheless,  undemocratic  political  culture  in  Turkey  deeply  shapes  the  attitudes  and 
behaviors  of  the  people.  In  keeping with  this,  in  this  part  of  the  study,  I  have  endeavored  to  
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scrutinize the mode of interaction with the state authority among the Alevi people in the Dergah. 
As the Alevi people do not live in a social and political vacuum, a consideration of this relationship  
may require to investigate to what extent they drift apart from the dominant political culture in 
Turkey. 
With regard to this, in the first of the two interview questions, I endeavored to learn  what 
they are thinking about the political involvement by the military. To this purpose, I chose one of the 
very recent political crisis during which the military intervention had been brought to the public 
agenda when the polarization of the society reached its climax during the April 2007 political crisis 
prior to the presidential election. Owing to the people's perception of the JDP government as "an 
existential threat to the the Kemalist legacy of the nation-state structure", the secular sectors of the 
society organized mass rallies, titled  Cumhuriyet Mitingleri  (Republican Meetings) in the major 
cities of the country (Yavuz and Özkan, 2007, p.122). One of the widespread demands which came 
into prominence during the rallies was the invitation of the military to the conquest of political 
authority. The Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı also actively encouraged the participation of the people into 
these rallies. I particularly asked what was their stance during the rallies and whether or not they 
supported the idea of the military involvement in those turbulent times. 
    
The adult expressed an overt support for the political involvement by the military. I want to 
add one caveat here. Although I interviewed with  the several people from the adult sector of the 
Dergah, the people with whom I interviewed are prominent figures who have a high influence on 
the people around them. G.Z.'s stance, more or less, represents the stances of women in the Women 
Commission. Then, dede as a religious figure possesses a discursive power on the participants of the 
Dergah. Particularly, on the question of military intervention, the majority of administration at that 
time  supported  these  rallies.  Moreover,  during  my participant  observant  in  the  weekly  Alevilik 
courses I sometimes heard an overt support for the military's extra-political authority among the 
participants of the courses. 
    
G.Z., the head of the Women's Commission, stated that she worked very hard in organizing 
these rallies and maintained: 
The military officers had to make a coup d'etat  on July 22. If they had made, our 
Republic would have not been imperiled that much. After that point, even if they made 
a coup d'etat, nothing will change. We are in the point of no return now18. 
18 Translated into English from original:  "22 Temmuz'da darbe gelmeliydi. Kesinlikle gelmeliydi. 
Cumhuriyet  bu  kadar  tehlikeye  girmezdi  yani  gelmeliydi.  Şimdi  bu  saatten  sonra  gelse  de 
farketmez."
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Dede, a very important authority figure in the Dergah, expressed statements supportive of the G.Z's 
stance:
Military intervention can become an option if the acquisitions of the Republic fall into 
danger  and  if  some people  betray  the  Republic,  the  principles  of  Atatürk  and  the 
military19.
With  regard  to  taking  a  stand  on  military  interventions,  the  youth,  without  exception, 
maintained  that  military intervention  is  not  a  legitimate  instrument  for  generating  influence  or 
conquest of power no matter who is in power. 
B.U. (35), a very vocal participant of the Youth Commission, became critical of the Alevi 
community in general and the figures of the Dergah in particular with regard to their hypocritical 
position on democracy. 
The Alevis  suffer  from a deep paradox in  this  issue.  Almost  all  Alevi  institutions 
participated in these meetings. However, it is very strange that the same institutions 
could not form a unity against the time-out decision of the Madımak massacre. They 
often claim that they are democrats but you cannot see internal democracy in their 
institutions. They claim that our cemhouses are outside of the politics but they never 
cease to follow the principles of Kemalism.  During the time of the education reform 
for the uninterrupted eight years education, this institution  helped the  Batı Çalışma 
Grubu (a military-leaning organization) to collect signatures; however, they had done 
nothing for the Alevi youth's demand for abolishing the mandatory religion lessons. If 
you ask the heads of the all institutions, you will see that almost eighty percent of them 
support  the  military  interventions.  They  say  that  the  coups  are  bad  but  not  all 
coups...There are good coups, bad coups, your coups, my coups in their discourses. 
Military intervention amounts to  resorting to  the use of violence in  my view.  The 
Alevis claim that they are against oppression and they are always with the oppressed 
but inviting the military to the intervention means that you approve violence. If being 
on the side of the oppressed is the greatest virtue, do not be cruel! Today, who makes 
intervention to politics is oppressive no matter who makes it. Today, if the JDP is in 
power, it shows the failure of the opposition. It is like a football match. You either win 
or lose. If you yell here and there, it  means that you can not overcome it with the  
power of your ideas; so, you will overcome it with the force of your muscles. It is a 
real pity!20
19 Translated  into  English  from original:  "Bence  cumhuriyet  kazanımlarını  korumak  adına  hoş 
görülebilir  çünkü  cumhuriyete  ihanet  ediliyor,  orduya  ihanet  ediliyor.  Bizler  seçme ve  seçilme 
hakkına  sahibiz  ama  yanlış  yollara  gidildiğinde,  cumhuriyetin  Atatürk'ün  yolları  yok  edilmeye 
çalışıldığında elbette ki şeyin darbenin yapılması gerekir."
20 Translated into English from original:  "Darbeyi  kesinlikle  meşru bir  yol  olarak görmüyorum. 
Alevilern zaten bu noktada bir çelişkisi var. Cumhuriyet mitinglerine ülkedeki hemen hemen bütün 
Alevi kurumları katıldı. Ama aynı Alevi kurumları örnek veriyorum mesela Sivas davasına zaman 
aşımında on tane adam bir araya gelmiyor. Aleviler bir araya gelmiyor. Aleviler bu noktada doğru 
akılla tartışmayı bir türlü beceremediler. Bu doğru akıl nedir işte kendini demokratik bir şey olarak 
tanımlama. Demokrasiden yana olduğunu söylerler mesela, her şeyin demokratik yollarla çözülmesi 
gerektiğine inanırlar ama kurumlarında böyle bir şey hiç yoktur mesela. Aynı şekilde derler ki bizim 
cemevlerimiz siyasetin dışındadır şu parti, bu parti, şu ideoloji, bu ideolojiden değiliz derler ama 
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B.D. (19) touched upon the negative repercussions of the 1980 coup d'etat on the Alevi community.  
He stated:
It  was the members of the Alevi community and the leftist  groups who became the 
greatest  victims  of  the  1980  coup  d'etat...The  28  February  Process  amplified  the 
assimilation on the Alevi community. We may not appreciate the JDP government but 
they are democratically elected. They received the 50 percent of the votes...I am against 
the all kinds of military interventions no matter who does it. The last one would strike 
the other party but they are human beings as well21.
The second interview question takes the question of  extralegal authority of the illegitimate 
instruments a step further. I wished to learn their stance on the legitimacy of resorting to violence. I 
asked whether they would consider an armed struggle in the case of further oppression by the state 
authority as happened in the case of the Kurds  in which the exhaustion of the democratic channels 
paved the way for  the guerrilla movement. 
With  regard  to  the  question  of  violence,  there  seems  to  be  a  consensus  among  the  all 
Kemalizmin peşinden ayrılmazlar...Burada da otobüsler kaldırıp gittiler. Hem ideolojik olarak öyle 
bir yapının içinde bulunmamız zaten hem de ideolojik olarak çok da doğru bulmuyorum. Sekiz 
yıllık eğitim zamanlarını hatırlıyorum. Bu kurum imza kampanyasıyla imza topladı Batı Çalıma 
Grubunun ortak çalışmalarıyla imza toplandı sekiz yıllık zorunlu eğitim istiyoruz diye.  Ama bu 
kurum biz zorunlu din dersi istemiyoruz kardeşim diye imza toplamadı. Çok ciddi çelişkiler var. Bu 
kurumlar kendi davalarının peşinden koşmak yerine bir takım yapıların peşinden koşturulmaktan 
hoşlanır duruma geldiler. Bir oylama yapsanız ve Alevi kurumların başkanları gelse AKP'ye karşı 
darbe olmasını ister misin deseler yüzde sekseni isterim der. Ama 12 Eylül askeri darbesinden sonra 
solculara,  devrimcilere ne olduğunu düşünmezler mesela. Bugün AKP dedigin şeyi 12 Eylül'ün 
yarattığı noktasında hiç kimse bir şey söylemez, yeşil kuşak projesi hangi dönemde ortaya çıktı, bu 
yeşil  kuşak projesiyle amaçlanan şey neydi? Aleviler  bunları  bilirler  ama bu analitik düşünceyi 
yapmazlar. Darbe iyidir ama her darbe iyidir demezler. İyisi olan vardır, kötüsü olan vardır. Benim 
darbem, senin darben...Ben o dönem kimindi bilmiyorum bir grubun şeyi vardı çok hoşuma gitti ne 
postal  ne  takunya  .Ben  çok doğru  buluyorum onu.  AKP'nin  izlediği  politikaları  da  son  derece 
başarılı  buluyorum.  Çünkü adamlar  çok  güzel  çalışıyorlar,  son  derece   başarılı.  AKP  ordaysa 
karşısındaki grubun kafasının iyi çalışmadığını gösterir bu. Adamlar güzel çalışıyor. Bu işler futbol 
maçı gibi. Kazanırsın ya da kazanamazsın. Kazanamayınca tribünden çıkıp da bilmem ne hakem 
diye  bağırmanın  bir  anlamı  yok.  Çığırtkanları  da  biraz  böyle  tipler.  Darbe  silaha 
başvurmaktır...Aleviler  der  istilaya  karşıyız  ama  düpedüz  darbe  çığırtkanlığı  yapmak  şiddeti 
benimsemektir,  şiddete  davetiye  çıkartmaktır  hani  incinsen  de  incinme  diyordun  mesela.  Hani 
mazlumun yanında duruyordun. Hani mazlumun yanında durmak en büyük erdemse kardeşim yani 
sen zalim olma. Bugün askeri  darbe dediğin şeyi  kim yaparsa yapsın hainliktir  çünkü acizliğin 
göstergesidir.  Ben fikren seni  yenemiyorum bari  şu yumruğu çakayım da bari  senden iyi  rekor 
kırayım diyorsun." 
21 Translated into English from original: "Darbe konusunda ne düşünebilirim ki. Darbenin en büyük 
şeyini gerçekten de darbenin en büyük darbesini Aleviler ve solcular yemişlerdir zaman içerisinde 
1980'de.  1996'da diyorlar ki  en çok dincileri  vurdular.  Yooo..bu sefer asimilasyon iyice başladı. 
80'den sonrasında..Belki hükümeti sevmiyor olabiliriz ama adamlar seçiyorlar inkar etme şansımız 
yok ki yüzde elli oyla geliyor adamlar. Darbeyi hayattta istemem. Çünkü bizi vurmazsa başka bir 
tarafı elbette vuracaktır o da insan o da insan."
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informants on that resorting to force is unacceptable. 
        
According to I.U. (52), it is the the moral teachings of the Alevi belief system that encourage 
them to dissociate themselves from resorting to force. She stressed the importance of socialization 
in the family:
Although we have been subjected to the various forms of oppression for so long, we 
have  developed a grudge against neither the state nor other groups. It is all about the 
spirit  of   our  belief.  Approaching  decently  to  any wrongdoing...  This  is  what  we 
learned from our elders and this is what we teach to the our children. Every single day 
I advise my children not to harm anybody before going out22.
G.Z. does not hesitate to reject resorting to force; however, she makes sense of her attitude 
within the  framework of the rhetoric of state security. In keeping with this, G.Z. maintained: 
We are extremely fond of our state. Hence, we never consider resorting to violence. 
We have never had such an opinion. How can I sell out our state? Do I have another 
state? How can you sell out your state, republic, Atatürk? These are our red-lines. You 
will not cross these red-lines. Otherwise, you lose your values, your humaneness. If 
you change, you lose your country. You have to protect your red-lines23.  
She did not cease to embrace the sanctity of the state discourse even in one of those instances in 
which the Alevis became the victim of the physical state oppression. Accordingly, she maintained: 
The Dersim event was not nice. None of the massacres are nice. Yet, it was a necessity 
at that time. For the consolidation of the Republic, some sacrifices were needed and 
the Dersim was a sacrifice for the Republic. As far as the Republic is concerned, we 
are ready to accept even dying24. 
In the youth's idiom, the right to life constitutes the main source of reference while rejecting 
the use of force as opposed to the adult who frame the issue through a state-centric discourse. This  
discourse involves the defense of life for everyone without conditions.
22 Translated into English from original: "Bu ülkede yaşayan ulu pirler öyle bir öğüt vermiş ki biz 
ailelerde öyle yetiştik ve yetiştiriyoruz. Çocuklarımızı sokağa çıkarken kimseye zarar vermemesine 
dair  öğütlerde  bulunuyoruz.  Açıkcası  sosyal  mutakabat  ve  barışçı  söylemlerle  büyütüyoruz.  Bu 
bizim inanç yapımızdan ileri gelmektedir."
23 Translated  into  English  from  original:  "Biz  devletimize  çok  düşkünüz,  anormal  düşkünüz. 
Dolayısıyla bizde şiddet yoktur. Bizim kitabımızda o sayfa yok. Ben devletimi nasıl satayım olur  
mu,  benim başka  devletim mi  var?  Devlet  satılır  mı,  cumhuriyet  satılır  mı,  Atatürk  satılır  mı? 
Bunlar kırmızı çizgilerdir. O kırmızı çizgileri geçmeyeceksin. Geçtin mi değerlerin gider, insanlığın 
gider. Değiştin mi ülken gider. Bunu koruyacaksın, kırmızı çizgiyi koruyacaksın."
24 Translated into English from original: "Dersim, bak kızım Dersim olayı tabi ki hoş değil. Hiç bir 
katliam hoş değil. İnsan öldürme ya da şey yapma hoş değil ama o zaman olması gereken oydu.  
Tekke  ve  zavilerin  kapatılmasıydı.  10  tane  tekke  kapatıldıysa  20  tane  de  zaviye  kapatıldı. 
Cumhuriyetin  kurulması  için bir  bedel  gerekiyordu.  Bugün cumhuriyeti  kurtarmak için canımız 
istense veririz bedel ne olursa olsun. Orhan Kemal'in dediği gibi ölümden öte köy yok. Cumhuriyet 
için ölünecekse ölürüz."
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B.D. (19) rejected resorting to force within the framework of the Alevi theology and shared 
how some events in his memory helped to shape his stance in regard to the violence. He expressed:
In Alevi belief the greatest crime is killing somebody. Why?Because human beings are 
the reflections of the God in this world and you are killing the God actually. Saint Ali 
said that if you killed someone, you killed the whole world. Under no circumstances and 
for no purpose, violence to kill can be justified. But sometimes, they intend to kill you. 
For instance, my father's cousin was intentionally shot by a police officer in the May 1st  
meeting, 1995. Is this justice? At these sort of situations, people feel hurt and may take 
up arms. It is difficult to comment because there is real pain here. Every sort of death is  
painful. People are delighted when a PKK fighter was killed. Yet, they yell and cry when 
the soldiers are killed. What is the difference ? The dead PKK fighter has also a mother.  
Who wants their children to be killed! 25
B.B. (17), a very young member of the Commission, commented on the some atrocities and recent 
unhappy events directed against the members of the Alevi community.
Although many Alevis were burnt by the fascists  in Madımak, Sivas, we have never 
thought to take up arms. The fascist mentality continues to exist. Nowadays, some Alevi 
houses are being crossed. Maybe, we will live events like Madımak again but we will 
never take up arms. Because we believe that if there is democracy in this country, we 
believe  in  the  value  of  communicating  with  others.  Our  tradition  encourages 
communicating but rejects the violence26. 
25 Translated into English from original: "Alevilikte en büyük suçlardan biri insan öldürmek. Niye 
çünkü sen Hakk'ın yansımasını o insanda katletmiş oluyorsun. Hazreti Ali'nin bir lafı var: 'Bir insan 
öldüren tüm insanlığı öldürmüş gibidir'.  Ya bu ne amaç uğruna olursa olsun bence öldürmemeli 
insanlar  birbirini  çünkü  yani  ne  bileyim  benim  ona  hakkım  yok.  O  canı,  o  yaşamı  ben  ona 
vermemişim ki ben ondan alayım ama Kürtlerin yaptığını da ben doğru bulmamaktayım. Arkadaş 
otur  masaya  yani  misal.  Sonuçta  bunu  sadece  Kürtler  için  de  söylemiyorum.  Bizim  hani  sol  
fraksiyonlarda vardır ya örneğin partizan filan. Yok öldürmeyeceksin, yani ne amaç uğruna olursa 
olsun  öldürmeyeceksin.  Belki  onlar  seni...haa  tepkini  sunacaksın  doğal  olarak.  Onlar  seni 
öldürüyorlar. Benim misal babamın kuzenini 1995'te 1 Mayıs'ta vurdular. Yani bildiğin polis geldi 
kafasına sıktı. Yani şimdi bu adalet mi? Adalet de bekleyemiyorsun. İşte o noktada insanlar kırılıp 
silahı  tutabiliyorlar  ama  işte  ne  kadar  doğru  bence  doğru  değil.  Ama  insanların  tabi  damarına 
basınca bir şey de diyemiyorsun doğal olarak çünkü acı var .  Benim de elimden gelse o polisi  
bulsam pataklaya pataklaya öldürürüm çünkü doğal olarak canın acıyor, canından canı öldürüyorlar 
yani doğal olarak...Acı geliyor insana ölümün her türlüsü, acı değişik bir durum...Şehit cenazesi 
şeyi geliyor misal. İnsanlar 'oo Pkk'lı ölsün ne güzel' diyor ama kendi adamın ölünce diyorsun ki  
'vay  şerefsizler  bizim  adamımızı  öldürdü'.  Onun  da  anası  var.  İnsan  ister  mi  kendi  evladının 
lmesini."
26 Translated into English from original: "Aleviler yüzyıllar boyunca hiç bir zaman silah eline silah 
alıp hani ben de mücadele vereyim düşüncesine kapılmamıştır. Aleviler Osmanlı döneminde kırk 
bin-elli bin tane Alevi kuyulara gömülmüştür, diri diri yakılmıştır, savaşa giderken Alevi Bektaşi 
köyün üstünden geçerken şunları da öldürün geçin denilen adamlar olmuştur. O kadar ki önemsiz 
bir grup olarak sayılmıştır Aleviler. Fakat Aleviler hiç bir zaman da bana böyle dedin diye sana silah 
çekeyim düşüncesine kapılmamıştır. Yine kapılmayacağımıza inanıyorum. Bundan 19 yıl önce nasıl 
Sivas Madımak'ta 30-35 kişi yandıysa yine yanar belki yine birşeyler yaparlar yine katliamcılar o 
faşist yapı yine devam ediyor. Belki şuanda da zaten var, evlere çarpı işareti koymalar falan. Belki 
ilerde  bir  katliam  yine  olur  fakat  binlerce  olsun  Aleviler  hiç  bir  zaman  silahını  alıp  dağa 
çıkmayacaktır çünkü Aleviler şuna inanıyor eğer bu ülkede bir demokrasi varsa gelin konuşalım 
düşüncesine inanır çünkü sohbet bizim için önemli bir yere sahiptir. Silahin bizim inancımızda bir 
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B.U. (35), an ethnically Kurdish Alevi, explained on what grounds he is against the Kurdish armed 
struggle.
I do not approve any struggle on the basis of ethnic identity or faith identity..Here, I am 
working about the Alevi identity but my purpose is not bring this identity to anywhere in  
this country. I just want to correct the wrongdoings with regard to the Alevi identity. I do 
not have a mission to make an interference in the outside world. Although I understand 
the Kurds, I do not approve any struggle which injures the well-being of others. I do not 
think that Kurdish armed movement will get somewhere because this is quite chaotic. 
There is a cycle here. Any action will always bring a reaction and this will continue. It 
goes nowhere27. 
D.Z. (30), a bilingual Alevi, prescribes an Alevi idiom for the question of peaceful coexistence of 
differences in the midst of all social cleavages characterizing the Turkish society:
The philosophy of "even if you are injured, do not injure" in Alevi theology does not  
mean to remain passive. Rather, it implies to finding an alternative instrument than 
the use of violence. It might involve finding the most common ground uniting the all 
people  and  rendering  unimportant  the  identities  which  separate  us.  If  the  common 
ground is constructed around being human, it will no more become important whether 
you  go to  the  mosque,  I  go  to  the  cemhouse  or  someone  else  goes  to  the  church. 
Otherwise, tragedy comes in28.
yeri yoktur."
27 Translated into English from original:  "Düşünmüyorum çünkü ben etnik ya  da inanç kimliği 
üzerinden  mücadele  yapmayı  çok  doğru  bulmuyorum.  Burada  Alevilikle  ilgili  bir  çalışma 
yapıyorum ama benim amacım Aleviliği bu ülkede bir yere getirmek değil Aleviliğin yaşamasını 
doğru kılmak istiyorum sadece.  Dışardaki hayata müdahale etmek gibi  bir  misyonum olduğunu 
düşünmüyorum. Kürtlerin de kendi taleplerini istemesine hak veriyorum ama benim özgürlüğümün 
başkasının neşesini bozacak noktaya taşınmasını doğru bulmuyorum. Silahlı mücadelenin çok fazla 
bir  işe  yarayacağını  düşünmüyorum ama 70'leri  düşündüğümüzde  ideolojik  anlamda  silahlı  bir 
mücadele  ayrı  bir  şey.  Ama  inanç  anlamında  Kürtlerin,  Alevilerin,  Çerkezlerin  mücadalesini 
kardeşlik  noktasında  çok  iyi,  doğru  bir  yankısı  olacağını  düşünmüyorum.  Niye  düşünmüyorum 
çünkü ülkedeki insan malzemesinin alacağı yere yansıyacağı yer çok doğru bir yerde oturmuyor. Bir 
Kürt olarak ben silahlı mücadelenin doğru olduğunu düşünürüm ama bir yere varacağını düşünmem 
mesela. Niye düşünmem çünkü dediğim gibi bu da çok kaotik bir şey yani. Sürekli bi döngü var 
içerisinde . O başka bir şeyi yaratıyor, o başka bir tepkiyi yaratıyor. Böyle bir döngünün içerisine 
giriyoruz. "
28 Translated into English from original: "İncinsen de incitme. Ben artık çok sıklıkla şey duyuyorum 
'yani incinsen de incitme sözü çok yanlış bir söz. İşte Aleviler bundan yandı etti'. Hani bu söylendiği 
zaman bu şey demek değil incinsen de incitme, otur yerinde hiçbir şey yapma demek değil. Başka 
bir  yöntem bul.  Yani  insani  bir  yöntem bul.  Bu demek.  Yani  hani  insani  yöntem ne  işte  belki  
yapılabilecek kendini anlatmak ya da daha doğrusu şu anlamda değil beni … edin anlamında değil.  
Ama başkasıyla insan ortak paydasını bulup ve inancı o noktada şey yapmak önemsiz kılmak. Yani 
sen camiye gitmişsin, ben cem evine gitmişim, öbürü kiliseye gitmiş, havraya gitmiş sanane banane. 
Yani yukarıda bir nokta bulup ordan yani hani şeyi buradaki farklılıkları değersiz kılmak. Değersiz 
derken önemsiz kılmak. Çünkü payda insan kılınırsa gerçekten sorun kalmıyor ortada payda insan 
kılındığı zaman ama payda Alevi kılındığında payda Sünni kılındığında öbür türlü kılındığında ama 
her zaman için şey diye yaklaşıyosun yaklaşıyor insanlar da bu işte ne kadar da hani şeyde olsa 
Alevileri öldürmek istiyor. Böyle bir şey düşmanlık besleniyor, bu damarla besleniyo payda Alevilik 
Sünnilik olduğunda. Paydayı yani noktayı ne kadar yukarda tutarsa insanlar bütün insanlar öyle de 
tutmak zorunda yani. Yoksa öbürü dram, katliam, insanlık dışı bir şey."
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To sum up, the interview accounts indicate the presence of two diverse orientations within 
the Dergah differentiating along the age groups. It is a very striking point that the youth interprets  
the specific events from a human-centric perspective while the rhetoric of the state security or state 
interest shapes the stance of the adult. Among the youth, the political adversaries are considered as 
agents deserving civility. In other words, not all means are legitimate to achieve the desired ends in 
the  youth's  perspective.  Yet,  the  adult  does  not  seem to  be coherent  in  asserting  a  democratic  
posture. 
Connecting this to the debate of political culture, Ioannis N. Grigoriadis (2004) remarks that 
Alevis have formed the sub-political culture of their own. He maintains that
Overt  support  toward  Atatürk  and  its  modernization  programme  also  crucially 
influenced Alevi political sub-culture. Atatürk’s modernization campaign was seen as 
liberating  Alevis  from  centuries  of  Sunni  oppression  and  was,  therefore,  fully 
supported,  despite  Alevi  Islam  was  also  among  the  victims  of  Atatürk’s  militant 
secularization campaign. Alevis considered the secular Turkish republic to be much 
more tolerant toward them than the Islamic Ottoman Empire and identified with the 
programme and aims of its  Kemalist  elite.  State-sponsored subject political  culture 
was, therefore, often well-accepted, and the convergence of Alevi political sub-culture 
with the dominant one was remarkable (pp.21-22). 
Interpreting the findings in parallel with the Grigoriadis' analysis, it can be argued that the Alevi 
youth are resistant to this state-centric Alevi political culture while the adult perfectly match with 
the ethos of this political  culture.  The distinct historical memories and political  socialization of 
these two different generations might have produced this discrepancy. 
6.3. Engaging with the Strangers
Controlling and monitoring the state authority within the scope of legitimate action might 
become a necessary but not a sufficient condition of acquiring the civil quality. Civility requires 
more than this. Civil communities accept the existence of other groups in society  and show respect  
and tolerance for differences which might become opposed to their objectives, value systems or 
actions (Akman, 2012). 
Civil communities are building blocks of the types of societies in which a peaceful existence 
of differences and social cooperation becomes possible. With regard to the Turkish context, it can be 
argued that Turkish society exemplifies how not to co-exist  with differences. Yavuz and Özcan 
argues that "the main problem in Turkey is the radical polarization of society, which is an outcome 
of Turkey’s political ethos of creating a secular and national society through the means of the state"  
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(2007, p.118). The Alevi community constitutes one axis of the long-lasting cleavages  underlying 
the fabric of the Turkish society. 
In this part of the study, I scrutinize how the members of the Alevi community view others in 
society and how they interact with others. To this purpose, as a first step, rather than being subjected 
to the ready-made poles of conflicts circulated in the public discourse, I asked whether or not there 
is any group in society with whom they have never interacted or they consider that they will never  
be able to interact or communicate. 
 
It  is  striking that  there is  no single category of  social  group on which the responses  of 
informants  concentrate.  The  responses  show  a  diversity.  Each  informant  has  a  distance  with 
members of different groups.  For instance, D.Z. (30) expressed that he has the most social distance 
with "the young from the suburbs who wander around at least with three people" since he believes 
that "when these sorts of people come together, they see themselves as a center of power which is 
able to exercise control over everybody". For B.U. (35) and B.B. (17),  ülkücüler is a group of 
people  with  whom  communication  is  impossible  owing  to  their  authoritarian  and  repressive 
attitudes. For G.Z., it is the atheists with whom she hardly communicates. For I.U. (52), she stated  
that she has no obstacle before communicating with any category of people. There was only those  
extremely conservative people from Siirt in her neighborhood but she even could communicate with 
them in the course of time. Considering all the responses showing a wide variety, it would not be 
inaccurate to argue that this picture refers to a healthy state of being as they are not inclined to 
otherize any category of people in society on the basis of their positioning toward the Alevi identity.  
The communication problems that they have can not be interpreted as a part of social cleavages but 
they are rather personal. 
Having indicated this, I inquired how the Alevi people engage with the members of other  
identity groups in society, starting with the members of the Sunni branch of Islam. Historically, the 
Sunni branch of Islam has often been positioned against the Alevi faith. The members of the Alevi 
community have long become "the other" of the Sunni majority and become the victims of various  
forms  of  uncivil  attitudes  and  behaviors  such  as  hate  speech,  marginalization,  repression,  and 
violence. I endeavored to investigate whether this legacy of victimhood and historical memories 
urge them to develop the feelings of hatred and repressive relations with the members of the Sunni 
Islam. 
Considering my participant-observant in the field, I can safely state that my observations are 
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not supportive of the unfriendly relations between the Alevi and the Sunni.  Rather,  the general 
atmosphere in the Dergah demonstrates that the Alevis in the Dergah are inclined to keep open the 
channels of interaction and dialogue towards the Sunni. In keeping with this, I wish to share some 
instances of friendly interactions with the Sunni people. For instance, in one instance, a group of 
veiled  female students  from the  Faculty of  Religious  Studies  in  Sakarya  University visited the 
Shrine,  participated  in  the  cem ritual,  and  made  conversation  with  the  Dede regarding  the 
differences between the Alevi faith and the Sunni Islam. In another instance, on a sunday morning, a 
group of  people  from the  Justice and Development  Party visited  the  Shrine,  had a  lokma,  and 
listened to the manager of the Dergah with regard to the problems they are experiencing. 
Moreover,   I  heard  that  most  of  students  who are  benefiting  from the  yearly education 
scholarship of the  Dergah belong to the Sunni belief. The administrators of the  Dergah does not 
make discrimination on the basis of faith. Furthermore, the participants of the Youth Commission 
often organize the concerts and semah performances. The money raised from these performances 
are used for the education of the poor students, residing in the poor neighborhoods in the eastern 
regions of the country regardless of the differences in identity.  
Having stated the general atmosphere in the Dergah with regard to the relationships with the 
Sunni people, I inquired their mode of interaction with the Sunni people in their personal lives. The 
responses show that the boundaries of  interactions shaping their personal lives are not confined to 
the members of the Alevi community. Their narratives suggest that the members of the Sunni public 
are legitimate candidates to develop bonds of friendship, marriage, and economic transactions. It is 
worthy of note that the Sunni public does not exist as a monolithic entity in their imagination. They 
often make the distinction of  "good Sunni-bad Sunni". For instance, the  Dede shared one of his 
experiences regarding this.
I separate the Sunni community into two. Not all the Sunni people are the same. Today, 
there are really enlightened Sunnis who know the principles of the Alevi faith very 
well. They sometimes visit our cemhouses and accept their prejudices about our faith. 
For instance, in the past, I led a cem ritual in a wedding saloon in Samsun. Having 
completed the ritual, the mayor of the city came to me, hold my hand and said: "Today, 
we saw you. You  mentioned about Koran, Mohammed,  Ali, and all good things. I said 
to my wife: I am worried how we will pay the price of all wrongdoings and bad words 
we directed against the Alevis"29.
29 Translated into English from original: "Şimdi tabi Sünnileri burda ikiye ayırıyoruz. Sünnilerin bu 
çağımızdaki çok aydın Sünniler vardır, Aleviliği çok iyi bilen, Aleviliği çok iyi araştırmış gerçek 
Sünnilerle  çok  karşı  karşıya  gelmişizdir  ve  cemlerimize  geldiler.  Cemlerimizde  hatalarını 
kendilerine ifade ederler....İki sefer Samsun'a gittim. Samsun'da bir  düğün salonunda ben ibadet 
yaptım. Yahu Samsun'dan gelen bir belediye başkanıymış ben o zaman bilemiyorum büyükşehirmiş 
orası.  Gelirken  cemden  sonra  orda   sünni  hocalar  da  vardı  orda  yani.  Elimden  tutarak  şunu 
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B.U. (35) also distinguished some Sunnis from the others. He shared some of his daily encounters 
with the Sunni people.
When I board the minibus, I go down immediately if I see a man with beard. I lived 
this  a  few times.  Because these  sorts  of  men  make you listen  to  religious  music 
forcefully and too loudly. I try to understand them. They are getting board on the coach 
but I feel disrupted from being exposed to these sorts of music. This makes me really 
frightened. For instance, I sometimes see that there is a sticker on which it is written 
"All  sovereignty belongs  to  the  God".  When  I  see  this,  I  never  board  that  coach 
because there is an ideological approach here which sees you as an adversary. On the 
other hand, I can board comfortably to the coach of a man who calls himself Muslim 
and  conversate  easily  in  the  absence  of  these  sorts  of  events.  For  instance,  I 
comfortably boarded a taxi whose driver was listening to the Samanyolu FM. while 
coming to here30. 
Finally, I inquired about their attitudes on the long-lasting headscarf controversy in Turkey. 
Seçkinelgin maintains that "Physical appearance and dress codes have always been significant as 
markers of political attitudes in the Republican Turkey. Yet, the Muslim women’s Islamic headscarf  
assumed a special position for it 'challenged the self-image of secular, Republican order of Turkish 
state and society' " (as cited in Saktanber, 2008, p.520). Owing to the its symbolic value, for a long 
time, the headscarf controversy "divided  the society into complex dissident camps each of which 
have their own reservations about the different uses and meanings of the Islamic headscarf "(p.515). 
In keeping with this, I asked about their opinions on the headscarf ban in the higher education in the 
previous years. 
With regard to the headscarf issue, there is a common pattern of thinking uniting the adult  
and the young. In general, all the informants interpret the veiling as an obstacle before the women's 
söylemiştir:  'dede  siz  bugün  burda  yemininizde  gördük,  hep  kurandan  söz  ettiniz,  hep 
Muhammet'ten Ali'den söz ettiniz, iyilikten güzellikten söz ettiniz. Hanım'a ben dedim ki hanım 
görüyor musun bizim bunlara dediklerimizin vebalini ne zaman çekeceğiz, nasıl ödeyeceğiz sen onu 
düşün' bunu anlayan kişiler var yani."
30 Translated into English from original:  "Ben bir minibüse bindiğim zaman böyle sakallı adamlar 
oluyor ben o minibüsten iniyorum mesela  iniyorum ya mesela. Niye iniyorum ben bunu 2-3 defa 
yaşadım minibüse biniyoruz ya ben çok fazla dediğim gibi hani  çok asabi, çok sinirli bir adam 
değilimdir, çok yavaş sinirlenirim ama çok sinirlendiğim zamanda çok kötü şeyler yapıyorum ya 
dediğim gibi biniyorum arabaya ya dediğim gibi ilahi müzik dinletiyor bana. Ya şimdi hani şunu da 
düşünüyorum adam yani yolda  gidiyor trafikte. Ben araba kullansam sevdiğim müziği dinlerim 
biraz  rahatlamışlık  anlamaya  çalışıyorum onu  ama  tepemdeki  kolonlardan  onun çalınması  beni 
rahatsız ediyor. Aslında on dakikalık yol dışında bunu şey yapmak istemiyorum çünkü  gerçekten 
çok sinirleniyorum bu tür şeylere. Yani bilmiyorum senin aracına binmiyorum mesela görüyorum 
mesela  'hakimiyet  Allahındır'  yazıyor  binmiyorum  çünkü  ideolojik  bir  yaklaşım  var  direk  bir 
ideolojik yaklaşım ve seni kendine düşman olarak gören bir yaklaşım ve binmiyorum yani. Kendine 
müslüman diyen bir  adamın arabasına çok rahatlıkla biniyorum, oturup sohbetimi de ediyorum, 
biniyorum, gidiyorum. Biraz önce buraya gelirken bir taksi şoförüne bindim, Samanyolu radyosunu 
dinliyor mesela indik efendice indik geldik yani çok böyle şey yapmıyor."
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liberation. However, it does not preclude them to show respect to the veiled women's choices. They 
stated  that  they do not  deliberately endeavor  to  socially  dissociate  themselves  from the  veiled 
women. With regard to the ban on the universities, they declared that the veiled women should not 
be  refused  to  have  an  access  to  university  education.  However,  they  have  some  reservations 
regarding the public visibility of the headscarf. That's to say, they are concerned with the public 
officials'  wearing  headscarf  on  the  ground  that  the  Alevi  subjects  might  become  subject  to 
discrimination. 
Ethnic  confrontation  between  Kurds  and  Turks  constitutes  one  of  the  greatest  social 
cleavages  dividing  the  society into  contending poles.  The widespread presence  of  the  violence 
within the conflict  for years has increased anti-Kurdish beliefs among the Turkish society.  The 
agony of the human loss and the strong anti-Kurdish beliefs have made difficult the talk of the 
Kurdish democratic demands for a long time. Particularly speaking, Ergin and Dixon maintain that 
"cultural issues, such as language and education, are at the heart of  the Kurdish issue in Turkey" 
(2010, p.1332). 
In keeping with this, I strived to inquire the attitudes of the Alevis about the Kurds during 
the interview. To this purpose, I asked about their opinions on the Kurdish demand for education in 
mother tongue. The main concern in this question was to find out whether the Alevis show feelings 
of  empathy  and  understanding  towards  the  Kurdish  demands  owing  to  the  their  being  two 
historically  oppressed  groups  under  the  Republic  or  they  become  distanced  from the  Kurdish 
demands, holding to the state-centric discourses of the dominant public culture.
The interview excerpts demonstrate that the adult Alevi's stance with regard to the Kurdish 
education is highly shaped by the "state-sponsored political culture", grounded on the principles of 
Kemalism. A state-centric rhetoric manifests itself in their interpretation of the Kurdish political 
demands. Ergün and Dixon's study on the anti-Kurdish beliefs reveals some findings in parallel with 
this. Accordingly, they conclude that "secular Turks are more likely than their counterparts to hold 
anti-Kurdish beliefs...Secularism in Turkey has historically been linked with the Kemalist ideology 
and its  emphasis on cultural  modernization.  Secular  Turks  likely  feel  that  Kurds are  a  cultural 
impediment to this process" (p.1343). Considering the fact that the adult Alevis are supportive of 
Kemalism and particularly secularism, it might have an influence on their anti-Kurdish beliefs. 
The Dede  resists to the Kurdish education on the ground that Kurdish has not reached the 
level of a national language. It is not capable of being a language of science. Also, the plurality of 
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vernacular Kurdish dialects makes impossible the communication among the Kurds from different 
regions. Moreover,  I.U. (52) argued that:
Education  and  instruction  are  totally  different  things.  If  education  is  delivered  in 
another language, there should be a separate state as well. Kurdish education can only 
be given in a Kurdish state.  But,  there might be Kurdish instruction like German, 
French, Japan, and so on. You can give Kurdish as a foreign language in schools. But 
if you want to have a complete Kurdish education system, you should separate your 
state as well31.  
Furthermore, G.Z., a Turkish Alevi who knows Kurdish very well, stated that there is no obstacle 
before the Kurds having education in Turkish comfortably because the majority of the Kurds know 
Turkish very well and only a small minority living in the remote villages can not speak  Turkish.  
She seems to be unwilling to develop a feeling of empathy with the Kurds although she stated that  
she came from the Kurdish speaking regions and observed the Kurds' experiences from the first 
hand. 
On the other hand, the stance of the youth strikingly differs from the adult's stance on this 
issue.  The participants of the Youth Commission interpreted the Kurds demand to education in 
mother tongue  within a framework of rights and freedoms. Accordingly, they stressed that one's 
access  to  education  in  his/her  mother  tongue  is  a  fundamental  right  in  their  vision.  In  their 
emphatising with the Kurdish young, two factors might become influential to make a difference: 
their understanding of common experiences of being oppressed and a willingness for coexistence 
arising from their holding intersectional identities of Kurdishness and Aleviness. The majority of 
the youth expressed that one of their parents are from Kurdish origin. For instance, B.U. (35), who 
defines himself as a Kurdish Alevi, criticizes most  of the Alevi community on the ground that they 
fail to make an empathy with the Kurds. He states:
Since the most Alevi equates Alevism with Kemalism, they consider that the Kurdish 
education will lead to the separation of the country. This is a paranoia. They could not 
emphatise  with  the  Kurds.  I  am  asking  them:  Imagine  that  one  day  a  state 
representative comes and says  "you will  no more worship in Turkish but you will 
worship in Japanese" or "you will no more make cem ritual but you will make another 
ritual". How would you feel? The people in the head of the Alevi institutions are not 
democratic at this point32.
31 Translated into English from original:  "Eğitim farklı öğretim farklı bir şey. Eğitim farklı dilde 
olursa o zaman devlet de olması lazım. O başka bir şey. Yani Kürtçe eğitim verdiğiniz zaman Kürt  
devletimizin olması  lazım.  Kürtçe öğretim olabilir,  Almanca,  İngilizce,  Fransızca,  Japonca gibi. 
Öğretim farklıdır bir yabancı dil olarak Kürtçeyi koyabilirsiniz o farklı bir durum. Ama tamamen 
ben Kürtçe eğitim sistemi istiyorum dediğiniz zaman o zaman devletinizi de bölmeniz gerekir."
32 Translated into English from original: "Aleviler diyorum Alevi kurumlarını bilemiyorum onların 
hemen  hemen  hepsi  Alevilik  eşittir  Kemalizm  politikasını  güttükleri  için  bu  böyle  tipik  bir 
bölücülük ülkenin bölünmesini temel taşları olarak görüyolar. O empatiyi geliştiremediler. Biri gelip 
bize deseki ya kardeşim cemevlerinde örnek veriyorum bundan sonra Türkçe ibadet etmeyeceksin 
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B.B. (17), a very young Alevi whose mother is a Zaza-speaking Alevi, touches upon the difficulties 
which are being experienced by the Kurdish children in schools. 
I am sometimes thinking the Kurdish children living in Diyarbakır, Muş, and so on. 
Until the age of six or seven, they always speak Kurdish. But when they begin to 
primary school, they encounter with the Turkish. Without knowing no single Turkish 
word, these children are supposed to say things in Turkish. It is like educating these 
people in English without knowing English. This is a very difficult situation. Thus, the 
education in mother tongue is a right33. 
Also, the young people expressed that they would be very willing to learn Kurdish if the education 
system is modified accordingly.
6.4. Engaging with the Members
The last but not the least important dimension of the civility is the form of tolerance which 
the participants show the internal dissent. Norton argues that "it is as relevant to look for civility  
within associations as it is to observe it between them. Ironically, groups that espouse democracy 
and other commendable values often do not exemplify these values internally" (1993, p.214). The 
social actors fall into uncivil forms of interaction when the majority tends to silence the voicing of 
the internal  dissent  no matter  how they are  tolerant  of  the external  differences  (Akman,  2012, 
p.333). Hence, a consideration of internal civility is important in evaluating the social actors' mode 
of interaction along with the other criteria. 
Under this dimension of civility, there are three topics which I want to problematize with 
regard to the Alevis in the  Dergah.  The topics successively involve the treatment of those Alevis 
who are ethnically different from the majority within the discussions revolving around the ethnic 
boundaries  of  the  Alevi  identity,  treatment  of  those  Alevis  who  are  part  of  marginal  gender 
identities, and treatment of the internal dissent particularly within the Youth Commission. 
With  the  reinvention  of  the  identity in  the  1990s,  the  Alevi  intellectuals  have  begun to 
thematize several issues with regard to the boundaries of the Alevi identity. Among them, ethnic 
biz size Japonca şey yapacağız bunu düşünün acaba ne olur  bize deseler ki  bundan sonra cem 
yapmayın  gidin  şu  ibadeti  yapın  yani  böyle  bir  düşünce  içerisindedir.  Alevi  kurumlarının 
yöneticileri bu noktada çok demokratik davranmıyolar kibarca söylüyorum."
33 Translated into English from original: "Şimdi şöyle düşünüyorum bu yeni yeni başlayan çocuklar 
atıyorum Diyarbakır'da Muş'ta falan anneden babadan hep gördüğü dil  Kürtçe bir  dil.  Çocuk 6 
yaşına kadar Kürtçe bir dil duyuyor hiç bir Türkçe kelime duymuyor ve ilkokulda 1. sınıfta Ali Ayşe 
gel  buraya  diyor  ve bu  çocuk farkına  bile  varmıyo çok zor  birşey.  1.sınıftaki  bir  çocuğa nasıl 
İngilizce  okuma  yazma  öğretemeyeceğimize  göre  Türkçe  de  zordur.  Anadilde  eğitime  ben 
katılıyorum,  özerklik de hakkıdır bence." 
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boundaries of the identity has emerged one of the most debated issues in a time of contending 
nationalisms. It was mostly a discussion which takes place among the intellectuals, though. This 
discussion has divided the Alevi intellectuals into two dissident camps each of which interprets the 
identity around one particular ethnic identity34. One group of intellectuals have argued that the only 
ethnic identity of the Alevi has been historically Turkishness and those Alevis who call themselves 
as Kurds actually belong to the Turkish origin, which were assimilated into the Kurdishness in the 
course of time. Other groups of intellectuals have refused this stance and supported that the Kurds 
have been historically legitimate followers of the Alevi belief.  
Projecting the image of this debate on the Dergah, it is possible to discern the presence of 
two  distinct  patterns  of  thinking,  intersecting  with  the  fault-lines  underlying  the  adult-youth 
confrontation. The circle involving the Dede and Alevi intellectuals affiliated with the Dergah tend 
to consider the Alevi belief as a historical and cultural product of the ethnically Turkish people. For 
the  Dede,  there is  no room for doubt  regarding the Turkishness of the Alevis.  He explains the 
presence of Kurdish-speaking Alevis with the acculturation of the Turkish Alevis in the historically 
Kurdish speaking lands. 
On the other side,  the young Alevis do not take a stand in this discussion because they 
believe  that  these  are  political  discussions  which  have  been  propagated  by  the  nationalist 
movements of Turks and Kurds in order to receive the support of the Alevis in achieving their 
desired-ends. Rather than reducing the Alevi identity to one ethnic core, they are inclined to view 
the Alevi belief as a common product of diverse cultural groups which have lived in Anatolia for 
centuries, epitomized in their discourse, "the multicultural garden"(çok kültürlü bahçe). Particularly, 
they maintain  that  defining  the  Alevi  identity  over  the  Turkish culture  is  not  reasonable  while 
considering the intense intercultural interactions among peoples of different origins in a culturally 
diverse context. With regard to this, B.D.(19) stated: 
On the one hand, we say that we do not make discrimination. On the other hand, we 
reduce  the  Alevi  identity  to  the  Turkishness.  This  is  contradictory.  Yes,  at  the 
beginning its origins might be the Turkic people in the central Asia. However, when 
the Alevi Turkic people come to the Anatolia, they closely engaged in the Kurds and 
Armenians.  There  happened  intermarriages  between  these  people.  How  we  call 
Nusayris, Arabic Alevis? They define themselves as Alevi. They believe in that way. 
Won't  we call  them as  Alevi?  What  about  Bektashi  people living  in  Bulgaria  and 
Greece who do not know any Turkish but practicing the belief in their ow languages?35
34  For a detailed discussion, please see : http://www.cemalsener.com/cs_tr/kitapayrinti1.asp?id=16  and 
http://www.navkurd.net/nivisar/mehmet_bayrak/alevi_kurt.htm 
35 Translated into English from original: "İnsanı ayırt etmiyoruz diyoruz sen Aleviliğin kökünü illa 
ki  Türkmenliğe  bağlıyorsun.  Tamam  özü  Türkmen  olabilir  ama  daha  sonrasında  Anadoluya 
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B.U.(35) added:
This  discussion does not concern the Alevi community because we have not  been 
interested in these kinds of discussions so far. Looking at the sacred sources of the 
tradition which were posed centuries ago, there is no such discussion. Our saints did 
not engage in discussions of "I am Turk, I am Kurd, or I am a Cherkess". If it had not 
been a concern of the saints of the tradition, why should it concern me? The essence of 
the tradition is very obvious: affection of the brothers and sisters36. 
Thus,  the  adult  Alevis  are  drawn  to  take  a  side  on  the  political  discussions  of  the  different 
nationalisms. In opposition to the adult's stance, the young Alevis embrace an ethnically inclusive 
interpretation  of  Alevi  identity  by going beyond the  ethnic  interpretations,  probably having its 
source in their becoming a part of intersectional identities. 
In recent years, some studies and media coverages show that very few people are willing to 
interact  with the  people  of  sexual   minority,  particularly in  their  neighborhoods (Esmer,  1999; 
Selek, 1998). Contrary to the nation-wide survey results, in this study, all the informants used an 
inclusive, open, and tolerant discourse with regard to a possibility of sharing the space of faith with 
the people of  sexual  minority.  I  asked them how they would  react  if  the  parents  of   an Alevi 
transsexual woman demanded them to carry out the funeral ceremony of this person in the Dergah.  
A very widespread discourse uniting all the participants of the Dergah was that "Entering this gate, 
we leave behind our gender identity. People have only one identity within this Shrine. Simply, we 
are humans". 
I.U. (52) is the director of the Shrine who is in the position of supervising the Shrine's 
entrance and exit.  When I  asked her,  she did not  see any problem in this.  She also shared an 
geldiğinde senin ailelerin Ermenilerle iç içe olmuş, evlenmişsin,  gelin vermişsin,  kız vermişsin, 
damat almışsın Kürtlerle. Yani şimdi Arap Nusayrilere Alevi demeyecek miyiz. Biz demezsek de 
adamlar öyle inanıyor. Hatay'da yaşayanlar, Bulgaristan'a çık, Yunanistan'a falan çık adamlar belki 
Yunan olabilir ama adam Bektaşi ve bu inancı bizden daha iyi sürdürüyor çoğu Türkçe hiç bilmiyor  
ama Bektaşiliği  Aleviliği  ben  ayırt  etmiyorum Bektaşiler  Aleviliği  gerçekten  özünde yaşıyorlar. 
Şimdi ben Aleviyim o Alevi değil demek en büyük yanlış. Onun da sebebi  zannedersem bu kültür 
içindeki  veya  ortamın  siyasi  durumu.  Biraz  daha  kendilerini  biraz  daha  yükseltmek  için 
zannedersem  çünkü  dediğim  gibi  benim  babaannem  misal  Zaza  şimdi  Alevi  değil  mi  benim 
babaannem?"
36 Translated  into  English  from original:  "Aleviliği  ilgilendiren  bir  şey değildir  çünkü  Aleviler 
bunlarla  ilgilenmemiştir.  Aleviler  bu güne kadar  yani  şeye  bakıyoruz  o Aleviliğin  kutsal  metni 
kitabı,  değişlerine  falan  bakıyoruz   yüzyıllar  önce  yazılmış  hiçbir  kaynakta  'ben  Kürtüm',  'ben 
Türküm', 'ben Çerkezim' deyip ortaya çıkmamıştır. 'Muhabbet insanı canım muhabbeti'  demiş adam 
bu kadar açık yani. Hani bu insanlar yüzyıllardır  bununla ilgilenmemiş  o zaman bize ne? Beni 
ilgilendirmiyor ki. Yani ben bir insanla, senle oturup konuşurken  hiçbir zaman şunu yapmadım 
kimle  olursa  olsun   'a  merhaba  nasılsın,  iyi  misin  nerelisin?'  böyle  abuk  sabuk  bir  bilinç  var 
dünyamızda anlatabiliyor muyum?  Bu beni ilgilendirmez Alevileri de  ilgilendirmez ama Alevileri 
ilgilendiriyor mesela."
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experience of her with the thinner-addicted children in order to show the sincerity of her response.
There is no problem in the transvestites' visiting here. The thinner-addicted children 
are as socially excluded as the transvestites. Four or five children as such often visit 
here. Me and they became friends. We lived an interesting event with them. Recently, 
they were here and ingesting thinner in the garden. I went next to them and asked 
"why are you making me sad? Did not I say to you that you can always come here to 
eat your dinner and have some tea without paying?" and they regretted and ceased to 
ingesting.   I  did not allow the security to involve in.  While they are leaving, they 
looked at me and said "if anybody injures you, let us know".Thus, this shrine is open 
to these sorts of socially excluded people. Why not transvestites?37
G.Z.  is  the  head  of  the  Women's  Commisssion  in  the  Shrine.  She  also  actively  works  in  the 
Women's branch of the Republican People's Party and takes initiatives in collaboration with other 
women organizations in Istanbul. When I asked her whether she defines herself as a feminist, she 
rejected being a feminist on the ground that she cannot approve a movement as such which is "so 
radical, unable to reconcile with the values of society, too focused on individual rights, disconnected 
from the real problems of the underprivileged women and promotes values disregarding the fabric 
of the family". Then, I asked what she is thinking of the transsexuals and also asked how she would  
react if  her prospective grandchild declares his/her homosexuality. 
Contrary to  her  previous  position  in  support  of  the  family ethos,  she  uses  an  inclusive 
discourse with regard to the people of sexual minority.  Although it  seems, prima facie,  to be a 
contradiction  with the  image of  conservative woman,  it  is  not  so much a contradiction in  fact 
because her inclusive approach of the people of sexual minority reflects an image of the tender-
hearted  mother.  She  views  homosexuality  as  an  anomaly.  Yet,  if  homosexuality  appears  as  an 
anomaly, she argued that the parents are guilty of this state of being owing to being wrong role 
model. By using the rhetoric of motherhood, she refuses the social exclusion of the homosexuals. 
With regard to the origins of homosexuality, her views are highly shaped by the prevailing public  
discourses. However, with regard to the mode of interaction, she uses a more tolerant language. 
Considering the presence of some homosexual friends in G.Z.'s milieu and her gender identity, 
37 Translated into English from original: "Hiç bir sorun yok bunda. Buraya sokakta yatan tinerciler 
geliyor. 4 yada 5 tinerci çocuk gelir buraya ki toplumun en çok reddettiği tinerci çocuklardır. Onlar  
gelir ve benimle ilişkileri çok iyi. Hatta çok ilginç bir şey oldu. Geçenlerde buraya gelmişler ve 
bahçede tiner çekiyorlardı yanlarına gidip onlara dedim ki 'Beni niye üzüyorsunuz? Ben size ne 
dedim  buraya  geldiğinizde  yemeğinizi  yiyeceksiniz,  çayınızı  içeceksiniz  ve  sizden  ücret 
alınmayacak demedim mi?' diyince 'haklısın abla' diyip hemen ellerindekileri torbalara koydular. 
Hatta  önce  güvenlik  müdahele  etmek  istedi.  Ben  üniformaya  tepki  verebilecekleri  ihtimalini 
düşünerek izin vermedim. Toparlandıktan sonra arkamdan geldiler, hatta yöneticimiz Hüseyin Beyi 
görünce bana dediler ki: 'Abla burada sana yamuk yapan olursa haberimiz olsun' dediler. Kısacası 
bu  dergaha  toplumun  dışladığı  (korktuğu  çekindiği  bu  kesimdir)  böyle   insanlar  bile  gelip 
gidebiliyorlar. Bu dergah böyle bir yer, hatta buranın girişindeki kitabede yazdığı gibi 'öyle bir garip 
konak ki dostlar, sahipsiz değil' yani bir bekçisi var, ama kimsenin malı da değil.  Ama her zaman 
buranın sahibi çıkmış."
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G.Z.'s stance is in parallel with the findings of many researches studying the origins of negative 
attitudes  toward  homosexuality.  Accordingly,  women  have  more  positive  attitudes  toward 
homosexuality in general than do men  (Anderssen, 2002; Whitley, 1990) Moreover, according to 
Allport's  contact hypothesis,  social  contact  with a stigmatized group should result  in a positive 
attitude change (as cited in Çırakoğlu, 2006). 
The social contact hypothesis also explains the B.D.'s (19) stance. He stated that he would 
see everyone as equals after coming through the Dergah's door. He expressed that he had a chance 
to have a conversation with gays and lesbians in a project against all forms of discrimination in 
which he participated as a member of a another stigmatized identity. An understanding of common 
experiences of oppression with the people of sexual minority  may also explain this. B.D. (19) 
stated  that  after  that  talk,  he  ceased  to  use  pejorative  words  stigmatizing  the  people  of  sexual 
minority. B.U.(35) also explained his positive attitude towards the people of sexual minority. He 
stated that
These people are among the categories of people who will give the least harm to the 
humanity. I really believe in this. Because their state of being oppressed makes these 
people more likely to emphatise with others who are suffering and they have often 
more fragile and indulgent personality types. For that reason, they are less likely to 
injure others38.
Therefore, the youth together with the adult have not a tendency to stigmatize and otherize the 
people of sexual minority contrary to the general tendency in the public. 
As a final point, I will endeavor to focus on the group dynamics of the Youth Commission 
with regard to the question of civility.  Although the young are successful at  developing a non-
repressive and non-authoritarian relationship with the strangers, there is a need for scrutinizing the 
youth's  internal  group  dynamics  before  qualifying  them  as  a  civil  actor.  Considering  the 
organization of the Youth around a deliberative space, the mode of engagement with the group 
members  needs  to  be  sought  within  the  deliberation  processes.  Discursive  spaces  can  become 
subject to various types of domination processes. The questions of "who speak", "how much", and 
"how one speaks" might reveal the dynamics of the domination processes within a given discursive 
space (Talpin, 2007, p.207).
38 Translated into English from original: "Ben insanın iyi ya da kötü olmasına bakarım. Kimliği beni 
asla  ilgilendirmez.  Şunu da  söyleyeyim,  insana  en  az  zarar  verecek  insanlar  da  aslında  bu  tür 
insanlardır.  Buna  çok  inanıyorum.  Hem  ezilmişliklerinden  dolayı  daha  iyi  empati  kurabilirler 
insanlarla hem de kişilikleri dolayısıyla daha kırılgan daha ince daha zarif  olurlar yani. Ben bu 
yüzden bu dünyada insanlığa en az zarar verecek insanların onlar olduğuna inanırım."
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In principle, owing to the eradication of the differences in status, all participants in the Youth 
Commission have an equal chance to express their opinions and to influence the decisions to be 
taken. However, in practice, not all the participants have an equal "feeling of entitlement to speak" 
(Talpin,  2007,  p.208).  This  is  because  of  the  participants'  perception  that  people  have  varying 
degrees of "epistemological authority" which means some people are more convincing than others 
in the eyes of the people (Talpin, 2007, p.208). Generally, the participants bearing a high degree of 
"epistemological authority"  are the seniors, the more experienced, the more educated,  the more 
competent  at communication skills, and the more confident in ability of the self-expression. D.Z. 
(30), a former participant who broke off with the Commission, expressed that: 
I had difficulties in expressing my stance. I behaved cowardly until the last day. This is 
because you do not want to argue. You do not want to live that tension. Because there 
is a really strong language, a sophistication, a competence on communication. Because 
you  observed previously how people  were  ashamed before  this  language.  You are 
worried with not being able to defend what you want to defend or not expressing it  
well enough39. 
In general,  this  situation yields us a picture in that  while  a  competent  minority unintentionally 
dominates the discussions, the participants with less competence and fewer resources remain as 
passive followers.  In  result,  the discourse of the competent  minority remains  unchallenged and 
internalized by others which precludes the emergence of a considerable dissidence within the group. 
The interview excerpts, which reveal that there is no significant disagreement among the members, 
confirm this statement.
 Thus, the Youth Commission is not immune from the internal power relations. Yet, these 
power relations are not a product of intentional or conscious processes. Rather, this is a result of  
deep disparities among the personal qualifications of the participants. The circumstances inevitably 
bring some participants into prominence.  However,  this  never turns to be an instrument for the 
repression of the dissidence as long as the dissidents do not violate the constitutive principles of the 
Commission,  which  require  staying  away from the  efforts  to  dissolve  the  group  like  invoking 
39 Translated into English from original: "Ben mesela toplantıda bunu ifade etmiştim. En son böyle 
tartışıp  ayrıldığımız  toplantıda  şunu  da  ifade  etmiştim.  Evet,  ben  kendini  ifade  edemeyen  bir 
insandım ve bugüne kadar da korkakça davrandım biliyorum çünkü şey yani insan bunu hissediyor, 
yani tartışmak istemiyor, o gerilimi yaşamak istemiyor çünkü çok böyle şey var, kuvvetli bir şey var 
dil olarak da yetenek olarak da kuvvetli, yani dilsel yetenek anlamında da çok kuvvetli insan var 
karşında.  Çünkü  geçmiş  pratiğinde  örneklerini  yaşamışsın,  rezil  olmuş  yani  karşındaki  tanım 
yerindeyse rezil olmuş. Ama tabi hatalı olduğundan ya da şey olduğundan. İnsan şimdi hani senin 
savunmak istediğin şeyi savunamamaktan ya da onu yeterli derecede ifade edememekten korkuyor. 
Bunun başka tarafa çekilmesinden korkuyor ve sonrasında ben bunu toplantıda bu itirafı  bütün 
arkadaşlarıma  da  yaptım,  ordaki  bütün  arkadaşlarıma.  Şunu  çok  rahat  söyledim dedim ki  ben 
korkuyordum ama bugün değil, bugün bunu rahatlıkla ifade edebiliyorum."
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schism, gossiping, and "being no one's man". 
6.5. Conclusion
 
Therefore, it is the argument of this thesis that the Şahkulu Youth has not only exemplified 
the idea of how the forms of organized communication help the underprivileged groups to formulate 
and circulate their discourses but also epitomized the example of how-to-coexist with differences in 
a society as such even under circumstances where the citizens are, once again, polarized into the 
dissident  camps  cutting  mainly  the  secular-conservative  and  Turkish-Kurdish  cleavages.  The 
particular  components  underlying  the  youth's  normative  orientations  toward  differences  can  be 
summarized as follows: 1) the ways in which the youth deal with differences in cultural and political 
contestation drift apart the state-centric/Kemalist/Republican stance characterizing the wider Alevi 
public,  2)  in  dealing  with  the  state  authority,  the  youth  displays  an  outright  rejection  of  the 
instruments (armed struggle and coup d'etat) which might lead to the construction of an extra-legal 
authority even though these means provide them an advantage in the political contestation, 3) the 
youth lacks a categorical antagonist-formed on the basis of identity and the Sunnis do not exist as a 
category of "other" in their imagination in spite of  being inherited a memory of victimhood from 
the past generations and exposed to the unpleasant experiences of being a member of a historically 
stigmatized group, 4) being members of intersectional oppressed identities help them to interpret the 
Kurdish political demands with a rights-based perspective and to detach the Alevi identity from its 
ethnic boundaries, 5) experiencing the burden of being a part of an oppressed identity also help them 
to understand and emphatize with other oppressed groups in society, 6) yet, the youth can not avoid 
falling  into  the  internal  power  relations  owing  to  their  incapacity  to  defuse  the  dramatic 
discrepancies among the "epistemological authority" of different participants. 
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    CHAPTER 7       
             CONCLUSION 
7.1. A Summary of Findings
The  fundamental  objective  of  this  thesis  was  to  scrutinize  the  nature  of micro  social 
processes  of  power  at  community level  in  a  particular  space  to  question  the  legitimacy of  the  
prevalent assumptions of civil society with regard to who should constitute civil society and how the 
experiences of the underprivileged are to be addressed. It is thus through an in-depth-analysis of 
informal  youth  activism  within  a  politics  of  place-its  dynamics,  complexities,  interactions, 
contestations,  and normative orientations-that I  have endeavored to "show how an idea with its 
origins  in  European intellectual  discourse  has  very different  referents  in  non-European cultural 
traditions" (Hann, 1996, p.2). Then, what does this empirical case study of informal activism of the 
Alevi youth in the Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı reveal? 
First and foremost, it is the argument of this thesis that the Alevi youth has successfully 
constructed a counter public within the  Dergah to formulate their oppositional interpretations  of 
Alevi  identity  and grievances  with  regard  to  the  unjust  participatory privileges  enjoyed by the 
people in power position  while simultaneously constructing itself as an embryonic counter public 
vis-a-vis the general Alevi counter public. In response to exclusions by centers of authority within 
the Dergah, the Şahkulu Youth Commission has brought pressure to bear on the authorities so as to 
eradicate unjust power hierarchies within a dialectic of two functions: a "space of withdrawal and 
regroupment"  and a  "base  and training  ground for  agitational  activities  directed  towards  wider 
publics"  (Fraser,  1992,  p.124).  Particularly,  within  a  discursive  space  of  their  own,  the  Youth 
Commission has accomplished tasks  of  self-mobilization,  socialization,  autonomous association, 
public  communication,  invention  and  circulation  of  identity  discourses,  creation  of  influence 
through an unconstrained rational discussion, and pressuring for accountability that have ultimately 
entitled the youth to emerge as a legitimate civil society actor. Nevertheless, the degree of youth's  
efforts at the sophistication of the communicative action will determine whether it will remain as a 
reactive movement or become an autonomous subject within the wider Alevi public. 
However,  this  thesis  has  gone  beyond  studying  civil  society  through  ontological 
components.  Rather,  it  has combined the ways in  which people deliberate,  cooperate,  and take 
action  regarding  their  common  interests  with  to  what  extent  people  engage  in  non-repressive 
73
engagement  with  differences  in  state,  society  and  the  group  itself.  This  is  because  uncivil 
orientations of the actors might lead to the self-destruction of civil society. With regard to this, the 
Alevi youth has built such a capacity of civility that epitomizes how-to-coexist with differences in a 
culturally diverse society as such. Particularly, whilst the youth abstains from any illegality which 
might disregard the rule of law and legitimate state authority, at the same time its vocabulary of 
emotions and attitudes do not involve the feelings of hatred, fanaticism, intolerance, repression, and 
violence in their  interaction with others.  Thus, despite the fact of being inherited a memory of 
victimhood from the past generations and exposed to the unpleasant experiences of being a member 
of a  historically stigmatized group, the Alevi  youth might  help to  raise  hopes  to  accomplish a 
peaceful coexistence of differences in a social context where the society is polarized into dividing 
camps.  
7.2. Some Implications and New Directions? 
Civil society is a notion which pertains to the historicity of the "West". That's to say, it is a 
product of the Western modernity which is based on a culture specific to a particular time and space  
(Neyzi, 2001, p.411). Nevertheless, it has recently gained a currency across the world owing to the 
processes of globalization. This situation has produced a puzzle of how to examine civil society 
outside the Western societies. This study supports that examining civil society in these societies in 
the way we judge in the Euro-American context shall  yield "a long list  of the absents" (Akşit, 
Cengiz,  Küçükural,  Tol,  2003,  p.44).  This  is  because  experiences  of  modernity  might  show 
differences outside the Western context.  In other words,  there is  not one but many modernities 
(Neyzi, 2001, p.411). Considering the case of Turkey, although the Turkish historicity has been 
penetrated by the processes of the Western historicity in a significant degree, the Western models of 
civil society could not fully explain the dynamics of civil society or structures showing resemblance 
to  civil  society  in  Turkey (Akşit,  Cengiz,  Küçükural,  Tol,  2003,  p.46).  The  penetration  of  the 
Western processes of modernity into the Turkish context might have caused an interaction of the 
culturally specific  institutions  with the western models of  institutions  and ultimately led to  the 
coexistence of different social institutions in the same social context. 
      
In this study, I endeavored to make an empirical analysis of a social institution, the Şahkulu 
Sultan Dergahı,  which has a unique status. Historically, it has functioned as a Bektashi shrine for 
almost six centuries. Today, it carries out a dual dunction. On the one hand, it functions as a place of 
faith (maintaining its historical function) and involve a rich web of informal social relationships 
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developed  around  the  faith  identity.  On  the  other  hand,  it  functions  as  a  formal  civil  society 
organization under the title of foundation and an administrative body. By virtue of these properties, 
it is possible to argue that it is a hybrid institution, epitomizing both the components of Western and 
Turkish historicities. Thus, this study is significant in terms of showing that an analysis of civil 
society  outside  the  Euro-American  context  will  be  imperfect  without  considering  contextual 
idiosyncracies. 
New studies of civil society in Turkey might shed further light on context-specific practices 
of civil society as the Dergah. Such studies might explore, for instance, examples of micro-spaces 
below the direct scrutiny of the state authority (suburban or rural neighbourhoods, informal women 
networks, various cultural rituals or ceremonies), various life contexts of the underprivileged people 
which is conducive to the formation of networks of social activism or the spaces where the realms 
of faith and social activism might be interpenetrated (mosques, shrines, churchs, or other places of 
faith). For instance, such a fieldwork can be carried out on the possible networks formed around the  
mosques to reach a comparative understanding of the role of faith centers in forming networks of 
social relationships, spaces of deliberation and various forms of social activim. 
So far,  the cemhouses or Alevi places of faith have appeared as a contentious object of 
identity politics in the public discourses of diverse identity projects. The construction and operation 
of the Alevi places of faith have very often  faced with the restrictions by official authorities. With 
this thesis, the Alevi places of faith have been immigrated to a different context. Cemhouses have 
often been discussed in relation to its religious dimension. However, this study shows that these 
places  have  a  great  deal  of  capacity  to  encourage  socialization,  communication  and  civic 
engagement particularly among the young people. In other words, they function as "a school of 
democracy"  where young people learn  how to voice  their  opinions,  propositions,  or  criticisms. 
Considering very low levels of civic engagement among the youth in Turkey,  Alevi places of faith 
are quite influential to encourage youth's civic participation. 
        
Apart from its significance for the current discussions of civil society in Turkey, this study 
might also open new directions for the study of youth in Turkey. The experiences of the Alevi youth 
raise doubts on the representation of the youth in the post-1980 public discourse. The activism of 
the youth in  the  Dergah yields  a  picture which challenges  the  image of  the youth as  "selfish, 
individualistic, apolitical consumers" (Neyzi, 2001, p.424). The story of the youth in the  Dergah 
epitomizes  how  they  have  actively  challenged  "the  established  hierarchy  between  elders  and 
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juniors, and the mission imposed on them by adult society" and how they responded their exclusion 
from institutional spaces by forming "alternative spaces and forms of mobilization" (Neyzi, pp.426-
27). This suggests that the Alev young in the Dergah have successfully constructed themselves as a 
subject against their objectification by the adult Alevi society. Neyzi informed in her article, 2001 
dated, that "The process of transition of Turkish youth from object to subject is still in the making".  
This study goes a step further and reveals the actaulization of this transformation of the youth from 
the object to subject from inside of the Alevi community. Whether or not this is a development 
concerning the wider Alevi youth needs a further investigation. Yet, if this is the case, it  might 
become a precursor of a wave of change in the wider Alevi community. 
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